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ABSTRACT
The concept of deregulation has been applied quite selectively in the
transportation industries, with considerable industry participation in
the choice of which regulations to eliminate, alter, and retain. Public
discussions of deregulation in the intercity bus and rail freight
industries were examined, iin conjunction with the industries' past
regulatory practices and their current market conditions, to assess the
companies' motives and degree of influence over regulatory policy de-
velopment. The two case studies make use of Congressional and state
hearings, Interstate Commerce Commission dockets, trade journals, aca-
demic and government reports, and conference transcripts to gauge the
range of topics considered.
Firms and lobby associations within each industry developed two in-
fluential types of rationales to promote the particular form of deregu-
lation sought. The first are social utility arguments, which stress
the public services the firms now perform, or could perform given a
specific type of regulatory reform. In the second type of rationale,
firms, or industry factions, focus attention on the perceived unfair-
ness to them of specific regulatory reforms. Regulated firms use both
types of arguments to narrow the terms of debate, often excluding full
consideration of broad public or consumer issues involved, and alter-
native forms of deregulation that might better serve the public but
upset the status quo arrangement of benefits and restrictions.
Several differences are observed across industries in the form that
the lobbying took, including the relative emphasis on administrative
vs. legislative changes, and the ability to form industry compromises.
Differences are also noted in the use of rhetoric. For example, rail
industry spokesmen emphasize the financial condition of the industry
and the prospect of innovative marketing, while bus officials stress
service flexibility. The differences are traceable to the industry's
respective economic and political environments, including such charac-
teristics as their cost structure and operating procedures, public
image, and traditional jurisdictional divisions in regulatory practice.
Thesis supervisor: Dr. Ralph Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Planning
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5INTRODUCTION
For several years, the idea that U.S. industries are over-
regulated has been taking hold among legislators and the general
public. If outdated and burdensome red tape were to be eliminated,
the thinking goes, industries would be rejuvenated. Long-buried
market signals would begin to clean out dead wood and summon inno-
vative services to life. Market discipline would replace both the
caprice of any one generation of regulatory officials, and ossified,
decades-old rulings.
This view of deregulation presupposes, however, that existing
regulatory structures can be dismantled at once, and with consider-
able neutrality as to the outcome. If the market is to take effect
-- blindly and without prejudice -- in industries where to date its
influence has been curtailed, then deregulation must also be a blind
process: a complete undoing of old rules without attention to the
effects on specific firms, specific groups of industrial or household
consumers, Congressmens' political status with their constituents, or
any segment of the economy which might be adversely affected.
In frequent recent attempts by policy analysts, economists and
other commentators to evaluate the early results of deregulation,
insufficient attention has been paid to the reality of deregulation.
Not only has it been far from complete and instantaneous in the affect-
ed industries, but of course it has not been neutral either. Faction-
al pressures from affected industries, consumer groups, regional
6interests, and above all, specific firms, have prevented the full
exercise of the deregulation concept in one instance after another.
The rhetoric of deregulation, however, continues to inspire parti-
cipants in regulatory reform debates and to cloud the public view of
what deregulation really means in any one case. "Greater efficiency,"
"lower costs," "heightened competition," "innovation" -- each supposed
attribute has a heady sound and together these concepts continue, in
a most abstract manner, to convince the wary that deregulation is, on
principle, a sound development, and perhaps more importantly, that
deregulation has in fact been taking place.
Without attempting to judge the concept of pure deregulation, or
the merits of any specific regulatory reform proposal, this paper
seeks to examine the selective nature of recent reforms as they have
developed in two transportation industries, the intercity bus industry
and the rail freight industry. In both cases, it appeared that de-
regulation would only partially strip away established patterns of
government-backed privilege or government-enforced denial that have
shaped both the behavior, and the composition, of the industries. In
each case, the particular shade of deregulation was instead conscious-
ly chosen, as if from a palette of possible hues. And the shades have
not been permanently fixed, but are subject to revision by the same
set of artists now painting the initial designs.
Since deregulation in practice consists of careful adjustments,
it would be useful to gain a better understanding of how those adjust-
ments are shaped, or planned. This paper focuses on the agenda, or
public dialogue, concerning regulatory reform in the bus and rail
industries, and specifically, on the types of arguments bus and rail
7industry officials use to promote certain reforms and block others.
A detailed examination of the officials' motives, their publicly aired
reasoning, and their use of popular concepts can help to explain the
ultimate choice of reforms (or implementation procedures) which emerge
from Congress and the regulatory agencies. While industry officials
are not the sole participants in public discussion about deregulation,
they are generally able to set the terms of discussion, and to greatly
restrict the range of alternatives considered. Hence it is important
to examine the way in which industry rhetoric conditions the planning
of deregulation. This is not, however, a comprehensive political
analysis; I have not kept score of the political actors who won and
lost, although it is sometimes obvious. The legislation discussed
here is relatively recent and subject to interpretation; and in the
bus case, it is still being formulated. Therefore it would be pre-
mature to specify winners. Instead, I have focused on the arguments
bus and rail officials use in their attempts to selectively influence
the direction of regulatory reform: how and why were they chosen?
What effects did they have on the proceedings, and with what apparent
consequences for policy development?
Two types of arguments are particularly common, and both appear
influential. In the first type, which I have called social utility
or social policy arguments, the companies stress the public services
they now perform, or could perform given favorable regulatory reforms,
as justifications for their positions. Social utility statements are
often, though not always, rhetorical facades, not well tied into the
reform proposal. For instance, a rail firm may cite its energy
efficiency record as a reason to block a merger that could put the
8firm out of operation, when energy use is irrelevant to the matter
at hand. In the second type of argument, which I call business fair-
ness arguments, either individual firms, industry segments, or spokes-
men for the industry as a whole justify their regulatory proposals with
reference to what seems fair from their:pointiof view. These arguments
incorporate such notions as handicaps for underdogs; equal chances for
success; favors deserved on account of harmful rules suffered in the
past, or corporate bad luck; and seniority rights for veteran firms.
On occasion, social utility arguments and business fairness arguments
are linked. For instance, Greyhound Lines cited a long record of
quality service in Ohio as a reason for regulatory concessions which
would preserve the company's monopoly there.
Regulated firms use both types of arguments to narrow the terms
of debate over regulatory reform. They may do this 1) by absorbing
most of the time and attention available for discussion, which is
possible for those firms with superior resources; 2) through super-
ficial discussions based on catch-words, when detailed analysis and
dialogue would be more appropriate; and 3) by limiting the range of
issues considered through repetition of a few, powerful concepts.
The firms' dominance of the public agenda does not automatically
mean that business interests will be served, or public or consumer
interests abandoned, in the course of bus and rail deregulation. The
firms frequently do not share a unified position on deregulation, and
intra-industry conflicts are often so severe that the narrowing of the
agenda comes about precisely because their conflicts take up all of
a Congressional committee's attention. Still, business-oriented view-
points and the vocabulary of business conflicts tend to emerge with
9greater clarity than broader public or consumer issues.
Even with the discussions framed in terms that industry spokes-
men select, one cannot simply assume that the ensuing legislation will
do positive harm to bus passengers, rail using firms and workers,
transportation employees, other firms, or the physical environment.
A regional railroad may argue for permission to lower its rates, and
thus be able to serve area farmers more inexpensively. Or a bus firm
may seek to make deregulation contingent on capital funding to improve
its stations, and thus provide greater comfort to passengers. But
business representation of public needs is clearly a haphazard process,
at best. Business domination of the regulatory reform agenda can result
in an impressive recitation of social concerns, but a fairly shallow
ability on the part of federal personnel to articulate or explore them.
And while it may not be possible in the cases here to demonstrate
positive harms, it is evident that little public scrutiny has accom-
panied the planning of deregulation. Congress has explored few alter-
natives to the status quo arrangement of benefits and restrictions in
each industry. In the long run, business control over the vocabulary
of policy-makers may be the most significant remnant of the original
transport regulatory system for these two industries.
This project focuses on transportation industries because these
were test cases, in a sense, for the concept of deregulation as it
emerged in the 1970s. A movement to deregulate the intercity trans-
portation service industries began to take shape during the Nixon
administration, and has been gathering steam more recently. Congress
passed legislation to deregulate airlines, trucking firms, railroads,
10
and intercity bus companies between 1978 and 1982. In addition to
these legislative projects, federal administrators have made many
changes in the way they implement earlier laws throughout the 1970s,
which together can be characterized as a regulatory reform movement.
Deregulation was not strictly a new concept: regulatory reform efforts
have been proposed in the transportation industry for several decades,
and the Transportation Act of 1958 attempted to reduce the scope of
federal regulation. But the recent legislative changes constitute a
more visible departure from past policy, and currently occupy the at-
tention of many transportation policy analysts, lobbyists, and mana-
gers.
The bus and rail industries are, of course, quite idifferent. The
rail industry has a longer history, a much more prominent place in U.S.
economic and political history, and is much more complex than the bus
industry. But both industries have been regulated in a similar manner,
by the same institutions. They offer some instructive comparisons,
since they represent both passenger and freight transportation. Each
has been considered a declining industry for a long period of time,
yet has remained subject to a stable regulatory framework until very
recently.
In exploring the deregulation agenda in each case, I reviewed
hearings, trade journals, academic and government reports, and several
conference transcripts. The rail case also makes use of testimony
from Interstate Commerce Commission rate and merger dockets. Each
case begins with a brief profile of the industry, current market
trends, and a discussion of regulatory practices that form the histor-
ical background for the current policy debates. I then discuss de-
11
regulation in the context of overall policy towards the industry, and
trace the rationales firms use to argue their positions. The bus case
focuses primarily on a single piece of legislation now being considered
in Congress, while the longer history of rail deregulation permits
consideration of a sequence of reform efforts beginning in the early
1970s. This difference affords a more detailed look at intra-industry
variation in the bus case, and a more dynamic perspective in the rail
case.
The final chapter compares the two cases in order to make general
conclusions and suggest situational factors that may account for several
differences observed in the firms' lobbying strategies, their motives
for favoring a particular form of deregulation, and for developing
specific arguments. The comparison incorporates both economic and
political factors, some relatively stable and others changing. The
chapter also sketches out several questions that merit further thinking
and research, including the role of external interest groups in shaping
the public agenda for regulatory reform; potential comparisons with
other industries; the influence of concurrent policy changes; and the
connection between industry rationales and broader currents of thought.
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CHAPTER ONE:
DEREGULATION OF THE U.S. INTERCITY BUS INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
A movement to deregulate the intercity bus industry began about
1976, In 1977, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) started to
grant route permits more liberally than it had in the past, spurred on
by pro-regulatory reform personnel in the Carter administration. In
the next few years a struggle developed over what form legislative de-
regulation would take. The U.S. House passed a deregulating measure
in 1981, and deliberations are coming to a close in the Senate. Con-
sidering the rhetoric which has surrounded the concept of deregulation,
the emerging legislation might be expected to overturn a full set of
government-backed advantages and obligations, putting the industry in a
pure market mold, and creating both significant new profits and a rash
of bankruptcies. To all appearances, however, the changes will be
modest, and new rules--carefully protective of the status quo--will
replace many of those eliminated.
From the industry's point of view, the key issue at stake has been
the prospect of alterations in the existing system of state and federal
route franchises. This system has aided some firms (including Greyhound
Lines) but hinders others (including small entrepreneurs). Discussions
of bus industry deregulation in Congress have emphasized intra-industry
conflicts over the route franchises, and a related regulatory super-
structure. A range of consumer concerns, such as service quality,
13
safety, and fare levels, has also come up on Congress, but on a more
limited basis than might be expected. Bus company managers tend to
raise consumer issueswhen they mesh with the firms' political positions
on the route franchise system. The firms, and several industry lobbies,
also stress what each views as fair treatment vis a vis the other seg-
ments of the industry. Each wants a slightly different form of dereg-
ulation , and some firms do not really want deregulation at all .
Since Congressmen and regulators hear bus company viewpoints much
more often than those of passengers or the general public, their per-
ception of the issues is heavily influenced by industry presentations.
Not only do they tend to consider franchise reform primarily a question
of business impacts, but even when attending explicitly to broader
policy issues--such as the place of intercity bus services in a hypothe-
tical nationwide energy-conservation scheme, or in facilitating rural
mobility--Congressmen and public officials readily borrow the concepts
and symbols put forward by industry leaders. The narrowness of the re-
sulting debates, often unsupported by critical investigation, makes it
difficult to evaluate the proposed legislation from a broad public
pol icy standpoint.
This discussion will explore the way bus firms have shaped the
agenda for regulatory reform, using popular ideas as well as direct
pressure, and their motivations for doing so. A profile of the indus-
try is followed by a short history of bus regulation. The discussion
then turns to the beginnings of deregulation and the role of industry
rationales in shaping legislation. A concluding section sketches the
social implications of defining bus deregulation as government and in-
dustry have together done, and suggests the type of consumer issues
14
that have been excluded from full consideration in this process.
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BUS INDUSTRY PROFILE
Market
The approximately 1100 U.S. intercity bus carriers serve a small
proportion of long distance travelers. By any criterion, the vast
majority of intercity travel is by private auto. It is often said that
auto travel is the bus services' chief competition, rather than airline
or rail travel, but this depends on the particular location and route
in question. Distance, of course, is a major factor and the airlines
are increasingly able to win over former bus patrons for longer distance
travel. In some cases, bus services compete with discretionary house-
hold activities, including local recreation, rather than other forms of
transportation per se.
On a nationwide basis, the three carrier modes (bus, rail, and
airlines) are not close substitutes. The rail system is much less ex-
tensive, covering under 500 lcations. Most rail service is concen-
trated in the Northeast. By contrast, in 1980 the bus system covered
14,600 locations and also served approximately 50,000 flag stops.1
Intercity bus service is available in almost all metropolitan areas and
in 96 percent of towns 2,500 to 5,000 in population. 2 Bus patronage
tends to be concentrated on shorter trips than either rail or airline
patronage (see Table 1).
Since the modes occupy different, though overlapping, markets, ag-
gregate statistics on bus market share give only a 'crude indication of
the bus industry's competitive ability. They do show, however, that
the bus niche is small, and that auto travel has made major inroads in-
to the bus market. Depending on the indicator chosen, the bus "share"
of the intercity travel market lies somewhere between 1.8 and 6.0 per-
16
TABLE 1: Average Intercity Trip Length by Mode
Mode
Intercity bus
Rail
Air
One-way trip length*
125 miles (198 km)
226 miles (359 km)
714 miles (1133 km)
*excludes trips under 100 miles (159 km) one-way
Source: National Travel Survey 1977
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cent, as Table 2 shows. The 1977 National Travel Survey, conducted by
the U.S. Bureau of the Census, placed the bus market share at 2.5
percent.3 On a revenue basis, the industry earns approximately twice
the revenues of Amtrak and 6 percent of those earned by the airlines.
The bus market share has been falling steadily throughout the past
few decades. For instance, in 1950, bus carriers served 4.5 percent
of person-trips nationally; this has fallen to 1.8 percent today.4 On
a geographic basis, no region depends on the bus for more than 5 per-
cent of its intercity person-trips. Busses account for 5 percent of
person-trips in the Middle Atlantic region and under 3 percent in the
West and South. 5
Scheduled bus ridership levels are inversely related to auto own-
ership.6 A significant portion of bus riders have no regular access to
automobiles, are unable to drive, or underage.7  Travelers with access
to automobiles seldom choose to travel by bus. (Marketing studies
consistently find that bus travel has a strongly negative public
image.8) The scheduled bus services thus operate on the fringe of the
other modes, especially autos. Hence, slight changes in auto owner-
ship levels, gasoline availability, license-holding or demographic
composition of a region can have major effects on bus industry revenues.
In addition to scheduled routes, many bus companies operate
charter and tour services. The large firms also provide package ex-
press, mail delivery, and other incidental services. Most bus com-
panies see charter service as an important revenue source. Charters
typically involve longer trip distances and much fuller busses than
scheduled route service. Consequently, profit margins are higher. Bus
companies operating both scheduled and charter service can frequently
18
TABLE 2: Bus Share of Intercity Travel Market
Mode Person-Milesa Person-trips b Passengersc Revenuesd
$1.4 billion
NA
$0.7 billion
$22.8 billion
aOak Ridge National
b,cICC, 1975
Laboratories,
dManagement Analysis Center, Inc., 1979
Bus 6.0%
Auto
Rail
Air
48.6%
0.9%
44.5
1.8%
95.9%
0.2%
2.1%
360,000
NA
19,000
216,000
1978
TABLE 3: Percent of intercity travelers
mode, 1977
Percent with household
income under $10,000
Bus passengers
Auto travelers
Rail passengers
Air passengers
60%
41%
38%
22%
female or low income, by
Percent
female
61%
46%
47%
36%
Source: American Bus Association, 1977 Annual Report
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use the same vehicles for either service, switching uncommitted busses
from one service to the other, depending on relative demand. For
instance, during the gasoline shortages in 1974 and 1979, major bus
carriers added unused charter busses to their regular routes in order
to expand their capacity. 9
Passenger Characteristics
The bus-riding population differs significantly from the traveling
population as a whole. Riders tend to be under 20 or over 50 years old.
(Only one-third of bus passengers are between ages 18 and 55. 10) Sixty-
one percent of bus riders are females, compared to 36 percent of air
travelers. Twenty percent are non-white. More retirees and fewer
professionals ride the bus than other intercity modes. Although ex-
perts disagree on the extent of car ownership among bus passengers,
some estimate as many as 70 percent are unable to drive.12 Many have
low incomes or are unemployed, and approximately 30 percent are non-
metropolitan residents. 13
While business travel forms 20 percent of all intercity travel,
only 12 percent of bus trips are business-related. The majority of
bus travel consists of trips to visit friends or relatives. In the
industry, this is known as "VFR travel." 14 Consequently, a small
proportion of scheduled bus passengers visit tourist establishments
or stay in hotels at their destination, in comparison to rail and air
travelers. 15 Not surprisingly, the intercity bus patrons are not
politically organized on a nationwide basis, in contrast to rail and
airline passengers. According to former ICC Chairman Daniel O'Neil,
bus passengers
21
are not wealthy individuals by and large. They tend to be
very young or...very old. They are the individuals who,
probably more than any others in society require somebody
else to intercede for them. They are not knowledgeable,
and in the rate cases we have had before the Commission,
I don't think we have ever seen anybody that has been a
user of the system come forward.. .They would not knowl6
what to do if they could appear to protest the rates.
Industry Structure
The industry is dominated by Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Trailways,
Inc., with about 65 and 21 percent of the nationwide market, respec-
tively.17  The remaining 14 percent is controlled by approximately
1100 smaller firms, which range from family-owned independents to
large-scale regional systems. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
regulates 750 of these firms: those whose services cross state lines.
State public utility commissions regulate the remaining (intrastate)
carriers, as well as the intrastate routes that the 750 ICC-certified
carriers serve. An unknown number of unauthorized ("gypsy')carriers
escape regulators at both the state and federal levels. Industry
regulation, which is described in more detail later on, includes control
of fares, routes, schedules, insurance, speed limits, and equipment
specifications. (The industry uses a basically standard sized vehicle
nationwide, serving both rural and urban areas, and lower and higher
volume routes. Highway conditions in all but a few rural areas permit
use of full-sized Greyhound busses. 18)
The bus industry is highly concentrated. ICC regulations dis-
tinguish between bus firms with revenues over $3 million annually
(Class I) and smaller firms (Class II and III). Class I carriers must
submit more detailed financial data, for instance. In 1977, 46 bus
22
firms--4 percent of the firms in the industry--qualified as Class I
carriers. As Table 4 shows, these firms controlled 70 percent of the
route operating authority (franchises) on a mileage basis, and earned
74 percent of the revenues.
Smaller firms operate most of the charter service, while Class I
firms concentrate on scheduled service and package express delivery.19
Charter and tour services provide approximately 30 percent of the in-
dustry's overall revenue, and 16 percent of Class I revenues, but only
10 percent of Greyhound's revenue.20
In general, intercity bus companies do not engage in significant
marketing or demand-forecasting activity. Industry expenditures for
marketing rose significantly during the 1970's, but managers still
emphasize day-to-day operations over long-range service planning. The
industry sets fares through a single nationwide rate bureau, the Na-
tional Bus Traffic Association.21 There are two formal lobby associa-
tions, the American Bus Association and the National Bus Owners'
Association, as well as several informal trade groups.
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TABLE 4: Intercity Bus Industry Structure, 1977
Class I
Number of firms
Percent of firms in
industry
Passengers
Passenger-miles
Bus fleet ownership
Route-miles of
operating authority
Gross operating
revenues
46
Class II and III
1104
4%
37%
64%
40%
70%
74%
96%
63%
36%
60%
30%
26%
Source: American Bus Association, 1977 Annual Report
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CHANGING CLIMATE
The bus industry has undergone a number of changes that affect bus
firms' regulatory interests. These include the decline of older mar-
kets and the availability of new ones; the financial decline of the
industry overall, with some exceptions; and relevant changes in the
other intercity modes.
Decline of older markets
Demographic changes have restricted the size of the scheduled
bus market. As noted earlier, the bus industry primarily serves per-
sons with limited use of automobiles. The portion of U.S. households
fitting this description continues to shrink, even in the lowest in-
come brackets and among the students and retirees customarily forming
a major part of the bus market. Drivers' license holding among the
elderly, for instance, has significantly increased over the past two
decades. 22  Population shifts to lower density parts of the country,
and to suburban residences, have also removed a substantial part of
the population from proximity to bus terminals. The companies are
seldom permitted to move terminals to suburban locations to accommodate
this shift. 23
General economic decline also lowers demand for conventional bus
services. Past recessions provide some evidence that bus travel is
more sensitive to the state of the economy than travel by other inter-
city modes. This probably stems from the higher than average vulner-
ability of discretionary travel in low-income budgets. It may also be
due to bus riders' greater susceptibility to unemployment, due in part
to their unusual age distribution. 24
Although demand for intercity passenger transportation has grown
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by approximately 1.3 percent per year since 1970, the number of bus
passengers has declined an average of 1.5 percent per year.25 Bus
industry revenues grew an average of 6.7 percent between 1970 and 1977
in current dollars, compared to 14.4 percent for the three carrier
modes overall. Since 1970, the bus industry share of total carrier
revenues has dropped from 9 percent down to 5 percent.26 Industry
statistics show that the year 1974, when gasoline was temporarily in
short supply was
The only point between 1970 and 1977 that ridership did
not decline. By 1977 ridership had dropped 17 percent
below the 1970 level. 27
In addition to the growth in auto ownership levels, average inter-
city trip lengths have increased in recent years, tending to promote
air travel. 28  Partial deregulation of air transportation in 1979 pro-
duced airline price wars in several regions, which have eroded some
bus carriers' former price margins.29 It is also possible that the
federal speed limit reduction to 55 mph (87 kph), undertaken in 1974,
resulted in some loss of bus patronage.
Availability of new markets
The charter and tour markets, as noted earlier, have been growing
steadily, partially compensating for the decline of scheduled service
on an aggregate industry basis. From 1950 to 1980, charter and tour
revenues rose from 7 percent of industry revenues to constitute nearly
half (48 percent) of industry revenues. 30 According to the ABA, be-
tween 1970 and 1977 charter revenues grew 177 percent.31
Demographic factors again help to explain the increase in demand
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for charter services. The shift to lower density land-use patterns
(both inter- and intra-regionally) promotes intermediate-distance or-
ganized travel in the range between comfortable driving distance and
economical scheduled bus or airline services. Intercity charter opera-
tors have been taking over functions once served by local charter firms.
For instance, in Texas, many high schools use intercity, rather than
metropolitan, charter busses to transport their athletic teams. The
same is true of church groups and other voluntary organizations
throughout the Southwest.32 Arizona and Texas have minimal patronage
of public transportation services in comparison to the Northeast, but
bus tours are growing very rapidly in those states.
Significant demographic developments are also transforming the
tourism industry, with implications for tour service. According to
one travel industry analyst, tourism is becoming more "wholesale" than
retail in its orientation. 33 Organized tours have higher prestige
than they once did, and a higher proportion of young people are sub-
scribing. An influx of foreign tourists also stimulates demand for
bus tours. (In 1980, for the first time, more foreigners came to the
U.S. to visit than Americans went abroad.) Hotel profits have increased
in many regions, creating an incentive for joint ventures between bus
tour operators and resorts.34
Aggregate financial decline
The bus industry as a whole has experienced a financial decline
since 1970. From 1970 to 1979, operating margins for Class I carriers
declined from 11.5 to 4.8 percent. For the 600 members of the American
Bus Association, operating margins fell from 9.9 percent to 5.4 per-
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cent during the same period.35 Revenue per passenger-mile increased 67
percent against a 98 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index for
1970-1979.
In addition to the decline in scheduled bus demand, cost increases
have contributed to the reduced overall profits. The cost of new
busses has risen significantly in real terms since the late 1960s.36
Carriers claim they have not been able to replace equipment as rapidly
as in the past. For instance, Trailways Vice President D.V. Taylor
noted in a 1980 hearing that his company has been
unable to replenish our bus supply satisfactorily. A
continuation of this unsatisfactory situation will lead
to deterioration in the quality and quantity of bus
service available to the public. 37
Varied implications for bus firms
Not all bus firms have experienced low profits in the past decade.
Among Class I carriers, 1979 operating margins in 1979 ranged from -4.5
percent (for Lincoln Transit) to 22.8 percent (for Kerrville Bus). In
the Southwestern region, operating margins averaged 10.5 percent in
1976, in contrast to 4.5 percent for the U.S. Greyhound Lines' profits
are close to the industry average. (The low proportion of charter
revenues probably explains why Greyhound Lines is no longer among
the most profitable bus carriers. Greyhound has focused primarily on
conventional scheduled routes.)
The climatic market trends discussed above affect bus firms in
different ways. For instance, airline deregulation raised short-
distance air fares on lower volume routes, relative to long-distance
fares. 38 Bus firms serving those routes benefited from airline
28
deregulation, while those serving more competitive airline routes
(where fare wars have taken place) have suffered. The shift in rela-
tive demand from scheduled service to charters has favored many small
bus firms without significant scheduled route obligations, while
threatening others with bankruptcy. These market variations are
significant for understanding the firms' positions on deregulation and
will be discussed further. Because of market differences, the industry
cannot be said to have a single interest, or position, with respect to
federal policy.
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REGULATION: THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM
The initial regulation of the intercity bus industry took place
in several waves from 1910 to 1935. Regulation began on the state
level with certification programs. Early state regulation focused on
safety standards and equipment specifications (for instance, bus weight
limits). But fare and market regulations were quickly added: all but
one state (Delaware) enacted bus market regulations between 1913 and
1930.39
Bus firms promoted market regulation, rather than resisting it.40
They formed statewide organizations during the early 1920s, in part to
advocate route restrictions which would prevent further crowding of
the field. 41 State governments typically responded favorably to the
demand for route regulation, in order to promote stable profits and
protect consumers from unnecessary service disruptions. While the
route regulations (or franchises) tended to serve the interests of
well-established firms, they also created an instrument for protecting
bus passengers from inordinate fare increases. Franchise rights could,
for instance, be denied to firms with poor service records.
In many states, early market regulations were a form of recipro-
city between government and bus firms. Firms took on less profitable
routes, maintaining low fares in exchange for monopoly or franchise
status within state borders. The magnitude of these tradoffs
probably varied among states, and has not been established. State
regulatory commissions tended to endorse bus company mergers, which
further consolidated the hold of successful franchise operations within
states. (Mergers increased the length of routes that a single carrier
could serve with one ticketing system.) Throughout a long period of
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consolidation, Greyhound Lines was in most states the firm most suc-
cussful in acquiring other bus companies.42
By the 1930's, more bus passengers traveled between states, and
interstate services proliferated. Interstate routes were still with-
out protection. (In 1925, the Supreme Court ruled that states could
not regulate interstate markets. 43) The spectre of "destructive
competition," or overcrowding, was now encountered in the interstate
markets, and established investors experienced declining profits.44
The bus industry began to put pressure on the federal government to
create a franchise system for interstate routes as well. The trucking
industry participated in this lobbying effort. (A parallel development
had occurred in trucking.) The Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the first
federal legislation to regulate these two industries, was the federal
response to these pressures for route protection. The Act was only
secondarily a consumer protection program.45
The Interstate Commerce Commission successfully implemented the
Motor Carrier Act to protect existing interstate carriers from new
entrants. Applicants for interstate route authority were now required
to show that their services were "responsive to a public demand or
need" and could be "served without endangering or impairing existing
carriers contrary to the public interest." Generally, the ICC found
impairment when applicants' proposed services would divert passengers
from the original service--whether or not the diversion was likely to
damage the company's standing.46 Like entry regulations in many other
industries, the Motor Carrier Act had a conservative effect, in this
case literally "conserving" Greyhound Lines on many major routes.
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Regulation and Greyhound
Since Greyhound is dominant among bus carriers, and a major
lobbyist in the deregulation proceedings, the company's regulatory
history deserves special mention. Greyhound began in 1925 as a
holding company for several southern and midwestern firms. Within a
few years, it began acquiring other bus companies. In 1933, it merged
with two other holding companies to form a unit of 45 former bus
companies in total. 47
Favorable economic conditions and increasing trip distances con-
tributed to the success of the corporation's acquisition program.
Greyhound Lines established a comprehensive marketing strategy, with
foreign sales offices and through-ticketing arrangements similar to
those now used by airline companies:
In 1932, Greyhound established sales offices abroad...
(By) 1948, they had 600 sales agencies abroad.
Foreign travel agencies were commissioned to sell Greyhound
tickets to travelers so they would be ready to board the
bus when they arrived in the United States. Greyhound
also established the first national bus network which
enabled through-ticketing arrangements. For the first
time, passengers could purchase one ticket for a route
that required riding several carrier lines.48
Greyhound's early success was in part the product of good timing: the
Motor Carrier Act granted antitrust immunity to the industry when
Greyhound was in the best position to benefit from it.
Greyhound Lines is now part of a $4 billion vertically-integrated
holding company, Greyhound Corporation, which manufactures approximately
70 percent of the intercity busses sold and used in the United States.
Greyhound Corporation also owns a majority of U.S. bus terminals,
leasing space to other carriers. Bus service forms only a small part
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of Greyhound Corporation revenues:
As one of the top 100 of the nation's Fortune 500
corporations, (Greyhound Corporation's) biggest
profit-making activity is its computer leasing. In
addition, it owns Armour Hotdog, Apian Way Pizza,
Burger King, and other food processors/retailers, as
well as Dial and Tone Soaps and Traveller's Express
Insurance.49
The ICC and state regulatory agencies did not actively discourage
Greyhound's early acquisition movement, nor its subsequent diversifi-
cation. At the state level, Greyhound has routinely testified that
its mergers and purchases would reduce costs and result in lower fares
to passengers.50 Several state regulatory agencies have adopted
Greyhound's argument themselves, using it to defend decisions favorable
to Greyhound in state legislatures. 51
Contrasts and similarities in state and federal posture
It is worth briefly considering the difference between state and
federal regulation of the bus industry in order to appreciate the de-
regulation agenda to be discussed shortly. Although the state and
federal regulatory agencies have created similar franchise systems for
bus firms, each system advances a somewhat different set of interests.
Statutes permit both the ICC and the state commissions some discretion,
so that rules may be applied either for industry or consumer benefit,
where the two conflict. The ICC tends to have a sympathetic posture
towards the industry in general, and Greyhound in particular. State
regulators, on the other hand, have frequently interpreted their sta-
tutes from what may be considered a consumer advocacy position.
With respect to fares, for instance, decades of relatively lax
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oversight at the federal level and stricter, consumer-oriented rulings
at the state level have produced a large difference between interstate
and intrastate fares on a per-mile basis. One study found that in
1979 interstate fares were on average double those permitted on
corresponding intrastate routes, on a per-mile basis, despite cost
similarities between the two types of services. 52
Most state governments have required bus companies to make internal
cross-subsidies from more lucrative routes and services to less profit-
able, or in some cases unprofitable, services. Charter and tour per-
mits are granted conditional on the applicant's willingness to under-
take "public service" routes as well. Similarly, states often withhold
permission to operate more lucrative scheduled routes in urban areas
unless companies agree to serve rural areas as well. These provisions
are similar to those of the Rural Electrification Program. In contrast
to state regulators, the ICC does not need to impose many cross-sub-
sidies of this type. Few interstate routes are completely unprofit-
able.53 The ICC also looks more favorably on service abandonments and
new charter applications than do the states.54
Despite these general tendencies the labels "pro-business" and
"pro-consumer" are reductive and do not accurately describe state and
federal regulation. Since the ICC's decisions (particularly on entry
and exit) affect the relative position of bus firms as much as the in-
dustry's overall welfare, the agency inescapably damages some business
interests as it upholds others. And a decision in favor of the bus in-
dustry, or its most powerful firm, Greyhound, is not necessarily damag-
ing to consumers, or potential consumers. The states' ability to
facilitate transport or tourism through bus policy is, however, circum-
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scribed by the adversary regulatory system. The only forms of consumer
protection authorized by statute are denials of industry initiatives:
fare increases, schedule changes, and service abandonments. States are
not generally involved in positive planning or funding of bus services.
Only past arrangements--and hence those consumer needs which have re-
mained constant--can be protected. For instance, state commissioners
cannot ensure adequate bus service between suburbs in two adjacent
cities. They must wait for petitions to come in, from firms that be-
lieve the services would be profitable. It is difficult for states to
force new cross-subsidies on the industry: maintaining the status quo
is the norm in many states. And as bus company managers are fond of
pointing out, preserving low fares--mandating fare decreases in real
terms--can ultimately lead to service degradation.55 State regulations
thus have an uncertain consumer impact.
Another reason why the "pro-consumer" appellation often given state
policymakers is unsatisfactory is that the state governments do provide
indirect services to bus operators. And although the federal govern-
ment subsidizes the bus industry only indirectly, nine states have
created modest subsidy programs for intrastate services. The assistance
includes bus purchasing and financing, public terminal construction,
and terminal improvement funding. 56 Most states also continue to pro-
tect established firms against new entrants, including new charter
firms, preserving the long-standing bargains described above. Thus
both federal and state regulation aid segments of the bus industry
against external and internal threats. And both are more favorable to
the status quo arrangement of privileges than to alternative concep-
tions of either consumer or business welfare.
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DEREGULATION: THE REFORM AGENDA
The Interstate Commerce Commission developed a strong interest in
deregulating the bus industry in 1976, when it began to grant entry
and exit permits on a more relaxed basis. In a 1978 policy statement,
the agency announced that it would disregard a key protective require-
ment imposed in 1935. As mentioned earlier, the protection stipulated
that route applicants had to prove proposed services could not be per-
formed by existing carriers. In its announcement, the ICC claimed
that this "adequacy test...has outlived its usefulness, and it will no
longer be applied." 57
Both the Carter and Reagan administrations have supported the con-
cept of federal legislation to further deregulate the industry. Several
pieces of legislation have been introduced in Congress that would pre-
empt state power over intrastate routes and fares. Since the state
regulations form the most significant controls on the industry, full
deregulation cannot be accomplished without preemption. Congress has
given most active attention to a bill the ICC introduced in 1980. The
U.S. House passed a modified version of the bill in 1981. The Senate
is still considering the bill. The Reagan administration has not taken
a formal position on the House bill, and is reportedly interested in
working with Congressmen for a more sweeping measure. 58
The ICC bill reduces entry and exit requirements and preempts
state authority to do so. It also establishes greater fare flexibility,
and removes anti-trust immunity from joint fare setting. (Joint fares
are the fares quoted on trips involving a transfer between carriers.)
It would also triple minimum insurance coverage from its current level
of $500,000 to $2,000,000, with provisions for the Secretary of Trans-
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portation to grant exceptions. 59
Most state governments are against the federal legislation, as
would be expected since it reduces their powers. Some states, such as
Arizona and Florida, however, have taken their own initiative in de-
regulating the bus services under their jurisdiction. Florida de-
regulated bus services in 1980, in part to promote service to resorts
that were suffering reduced patronage as a result of high fuel costs.60
During the past few years, as deregulation has become a popular
issue, bus companies have taken different sides on the matter. When
the ICC first began to relax entry standards, many bus firms objected,
fearing that their routes would be confiscated. Greyhound was among the
firms protesting what it called "arbitrary administrative deregulation."
The company called for total legislative deregulation, to ensure uniform
treatment of cases. (Uniform treatment of cases, would of course be
different from uniform treatment of companies, since Greyhound dominates
the market.) Although the American Bus Association has come out in
favor of the House compromise, it initially opposed deregulation. The
lobby introduced a limited reform proposal which would not have pre-
empted state route authority.. 61 But once the strength of deregulation
as a political concept, which of course extended beyond the transporta-
tion industries, became apparent to all parties, the bus carriers'
tactics shifted. They concerned themselves with shaping the course of
deregulation to fit their needs, rather than simply opposing it.
The struggle to shape the specific provisions under which govern-
ment would "return the bus industry to the free market" suggests that
deregulation does not always, nor perhaps generally, signify a cessa-
tion of government involvement in the industry. Instead, deregulation
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created an opportunity for joint public and private re-planning of the
market. It appears that secular changes in demand or costs--market
signals--form a backdrop for the joint planning that is called de-
regulation. Government is sensitive to market cues, such as declining
demand and profits, in the industries it regulates. Because the fed-
eral government cannot easily stimulate demand, these exogenous condi-
tions do form a boundary of economic feasibility for regulation. But
within the boundary, a great variety of solutions can be developed. In
the process, other governmental objectives enter in, such as the desire
to update service; to satisfy powerful lobby groups; or to conform to a
general precept that regulation is unnecessary. The outcome of deregu-
lation is managed to a significant degree by this joint political pro-
cess.
A key element in the bus deregulation process is the industry's
use of political rationales. Bus industry representatives have largely
managed to control the terms of dialogue on deregulation as a public
policy, using two different kinds of rationales. The first set draw
upon an ethic of business fairness. The second set includes public
service rationales. Some of them are nearly as old as the industry
itself, and have been used in numerous policy debates in the past. For
instance,
* "The U.S. has the best bus system in the world."62
* "We provide for vital transportation needs not served
by any other mode."63
Others were invented expressly for use in the deregulation hearings.
The industry's repertoire of rationales ranges from its record of ser-
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vice to the poor and handicapped to, more recently, energy conserva-
tion. By coupling these themes of service to its business ends, the
bus industry has significantly shaped public perception of bus policy
issues, The industry also bases many of its policy arguments on de-
mands for equal treatment (whether in regulation, taxation, or subsidy)
with Amtrak and the airlines. Equal treatment also forms an important
theme for intraindustry disputes, as each firm sets forth what it
deserves from deregulation.
Within the general pattern of fairness and service rationales,
each element of the industry advances slightly different arguments.
Each emphasizes different public missions and standards for equitable
treatment. This is because each group seeks to use governmental author-
ity in a different way. Taken together, their arguments have given the
Congressional agenda a narrow and business-oriented cast, since public
concerns mainly enter it in a rhetorical manner.
The wider social significance of bus services is not lost on bus
executives. For instance, when George Snyder of Greyhound Lines
testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on Tourism
and Energy in 1979, he pointed out that busses were the most energy ef-
ficient form of intercity transportation, and that the rate of return
on equipment was falling. This threatened to increase the average age
of fleet, which he claimed was a key determinant of passengers' will-
ingness to try the bus. Finally, he indicated that travel and tourism
*
Several carriers have a policy of permitting handicapped pas-
sengers to bring an assisting person on the trip at no extra cost. The
offer is seldom utilized,64 and therefore costs the companies little,
while being publicly well-received.
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support 5 million jobs in the U.S., that tourism is "one of the top
three industries in almost all 50 states," and "contributes over $20
billion to the economy. "65 Snyder implied that special favors to the
bus industry would capture additional passengers, helping the industry
serve a tourism function and preserving jobs vulnerable to energy
prices as well.
Congressmen often adopt similar conceptual links between firms
profits and their ability or willingness to serve social functions.
Senator Russell Long testified in 1977 that:
"Today's hearing on the financial condition of.the intercity
motor bus industry assumes added importance in light of our
Nation's energy situation. In order to begin achieving
meaningful reductions in the amount of oil we consume, we
should be searching for ways to get people out of private
automobiles...Intercity motor buses are ideally suited
for passenger transportation because they serve 16,000
cities, towns, and communities. They are convenient and
accessible and they are fuel efficient...Unfortunately, during
the past few years, we have seen a deterioration in the
earnings pictures for the bus industry. Six years ago the
industry earned about 11 cents per bus mile operated, but
last year the figure dropped to a little over 5 cents per
mile. "66
Analogous links between bus firms' financial and political status,
their managers' desires for specific forms of deregulation, and the
social functions the industry serves have been made throughout the
hearings. The social arguments bus executives use are shaped by
their relative market positions.
The smallest carriers, concerned about liberalized entry pro-
visions, stress their safety record. The largest, Greyhound and Trail-
ways, note their long history of comprehensive coverage. Medium-sized
firms focus on more general bus attributes, such as the ability to
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save energy or serve poorer households. Charter-oriented firms
interested in dumping nonremunerative scheduled routes stress the
link between their profits and their potential service to the tourism
industry. The arguments overlap, but are chosen to match the con-
cession sought. A brief review of the major positions in the deregu-
lation process will illustrate this point further.
Greyhound's position
Greyhound Lines supported the ICC bill in its original form.
(The bill would have allowed Greyhound to abandon less profitable
services and to take over many "small fry" routes now protected against
Greyhound.67) The company's support for the bill was a quick turn-
around in its relationship with the ICC which had deteriorated during
the Carter administration. As noted above, the ICC's unilateral ef-
fort to reform its own entry regulation drew fire from Greyhound. The
company issued an angry policy statement in 1979, saying that the ICC
had abandoned a long-established trust:
For forty years the interpretation.. .of the.. .Motor Carrier
Act.. .was consistent with the Congressional objective...
"to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient
transportation" and "to encourage sound economic conditions
in transportation..." The-result was a mutually beneficial
partnership of the regulator and the carrier (which) existed
in proper and fruitful balance from 1935 until the mid-1970's.
At that time and to this date, the regulator.. .has nullified
that partnership by embracing a policy of uneven and ill-
considered administrative deregulation. The result is that
carriers today are shouldering many of the burdens of de-
regulation but realizing few of the benefits.. .The ICC has
embarked upon an ill-advised philosophy of re-regulation
which is hastily resulting in the dismemberment of meaning-
ful and productive regulation while also contributing to
the substantia deterioration of the financial strength of
the industry.6
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The company statement faulted the ICC for reducing the entry process
to a meaningless series of ministerial steps.. .The carefully
constructed tests for the balancing of the interests of
existing carriers against the proposals of new applicants,
while weighing the public interest, are no more. In two
short years the Commission has buried the criteria developed
over fort years for judging the application of prospective
entrants.
But Greyhound was also beginning to realize that the carefully
constructed tests were on their way out. Seeing the handwriting on
the ICC wall, company executives recognized that a far-reaching form
of deregulation could be of help to the company because of its already
established market power. A company paper states:
Although we firmly believe that the regulatory balance
achieved between 1935 and 1975 is a principal reason
for the development of the world's best intercity bus
transportation system, we are realistic and recognize
that there will not be a return to that form of regula-
tion in the foreseeable future. At the same time, we
sincerely believe that the piecemeal deregulation are
presently experiencing is producing the worse form of
deregulation from the standpoint of both the consumer
and the carrier.70
By 1981, when legislative deregulation was imminent, Greyhound no
longer advocated the careful tests. The company's new line was to
favor "efficiency":
The bottom line of deregulation is simple...the reform
of an archaic regulatory structure that thwarts
efficiency.7
Greyhound's strategy thus entails a mixture of different public
service claims, depending on the time and place. In the example above,
the firm shifted from a "careful balance" rationale to one of "effi-
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ciency." Another contrast shows up in Greyhound's state and federal
lobbying efforts. In Ohio, where a state deregulation bill has been
proposed, the company is lobbying in favor of continued regulation. 72
Greyhound holds a virtual monopoly on Ohio intercity service. Across-
the-board deregulation would likely result in parts of Greyhound's Ohio
"route property" being confiscated by other firms.
A Greyhound executive defends the seeming contradiction between
its position in Ohio and in Washington, D.C., by claiming that Ohio is
a special case--in Ohio, Greyhound performs unusual public services:
"Greyhound has a covenant with the state of Ohio to provide
service on certain money-losing routes in exchange for pro-
tection from destructive competition. We provide competent
personnel, modern terminals, reliable equipment...We serve
hundreds of Ohio towns and hamlets where there are few
travelers--certainly not enough to justify the kind of ser-
vice they receive--and we lose money providing this service.
In return, we7Are permitted to have limited franchises on
some routes."
Of course, Greyhound has a similar covenant in many other states, but
this does not prevent use of the argument. And despite the company's
protests, the ICC's relaxed entry provisions also applied to Greyhound.
(During 1975-1977 the TCC approved 14 new routes for the company. 74)
Trailway's position
Trailways also uses contradictory arguments to suitits varied lob-
bying environments. The company wants continued regulation in Colorado,
where it has an advantage over Greyhound. But on the interstate level,
Trailways advocates a staged deregulation process with a built in handi-
*
Trailways, however, obtained one small route there in 1980.
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cap for Greyhound. In House hearings on deregulation a company execu-
tive argued:
"Trailways wants deregulation for itself and other bus
companies, but believes Greyhound should continue to
remain subject to regulation for a transition period
if there is to be any real competition on inter- and
intrastate routes.
"During the transition period, Trailways could set up
competition along Greyhound's routes but would be pro-
tected from retaliation by the larger bus company.
Greyhound is so much larger and stronger that Trailways
might not survive the onslaught that could result from
immediate freedom of entry and exit for Greyhound. We
are playing with a stacked deck, and Greyhound has al-
ready been dealt the winning hand." 75
In these remarks, the Trailways spokesman refrained from linking the
company's profitability to social functions such as rural transport
service, energy savings, or employment, which presumably Greyhound
could equally well provide. The argument instead hinged on the bus-
iness virtue of fair play. Trailways advocated, in a sense, rules of
war. But on other occasions, Trailways' strategy is to combine the
fairness argument with one of passenger comfort. Trailways has been
pressuring for a federal program of bus terminal construction, argu-
ing justifiably that ridership has dropped due to unattractive and
inconveniently located bus stations.
Trailways wants to see deregulation linked to subsidies useful to
its own operations.76 In addition to the marketing benefits of better
stations, Trailways is concerned about the market power Greyhound holds
through its ownership of most bus terminals Trailways uses.77 Grey-
hound recently attempted to deny competitors the right to renew leases
in some of its stations. Although a federal court order prohibited
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Greyhound from carrying out this threat, continued terminal rights for
Trailways and smaller carriers are not secure.78 Unless Congress man-
dates continuation of status quo leasing arrangements in the deregula-
tion bill, it is possible Greyhound competitors will lose some station
space.79 Equitable terminal rights formed a significant issue in one
recent seminar the ICC conducted with the industry.80 Trailways hopes
for a satisfactory resolution, either in the form of permanent leasing
rights or assistance in constructing its own terminals.
American Bus Association position
The main industry lobby, the ABA, also mixes social arguments with
business fairness in its testimony. (The organization has been instru-
mental in developing compromise positions on bus policy issues in the
past. It represents a broad spectrum of firms, including the two
dominant carriers and approximately 600 others.) In the present case,
the ABA opposes total deregulation, claiming it would disrupt the in-
dustry and "could leave thousands of communities with no public trans-
portation."81 The organization argues for "re-establishment of mean-
ingful controls on entry," and supports continued collective fare-
setting. The ABA also advocates freer exit from services found in-
essential, and those which cannot be locally subsidized. (Undoubtedly,
many of these are the same dependent communities hauled in for the
disruption argument above.) The ABA, like Trailways, is also campaign-
ing for further federal subsidies to the bus industry, including a
relaxation of highway toll requirements. 82
The ABA has offered its own plan for more limited regulatory reform.
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An important element in its proposal is an increase in the minimum
insurance coverage from the current level of $500,000 to $2,000,000.83
This provision appears to be a concession to small carriers, who are
concerned that a flood of new entrants might take over some of their
established routes upon deregulation of entry. The new firms could
potentially set up operation along the most lucrative routes. By using
non-union labor and other economies of business youth, they could con-
ceivably engage in "cream-skimming" (taking the most lucrative service
only), which could be harmful to established small firms. By increas-
ing financial barriers to entry, the insurance provision would mitigate
the threat of relaxed administrative behavior.
Small companies' positions
Like stability, passenger convenience is a recognized concern in
the deregulation proceedings, but it comes under the rubric of fair
competition as well. The smaller bus companies insist on the preserva-
tion of joint fare-setting (through-ticketing and baggage handling) and
terminal leasing rights.84 Without antitrust immunity for joint rates,
they fear passengers will desert them, due to the inconvenience of
having to purchase separate tickets and transfer their own luggage at
each leg of the journey.
The charter-oriented small companies combine the fairness rhetoric
with the public service problem of illegal bus operations. They want
deregulation laws to include stricter inspection and enforcement
standards than the ICC has developed in the past. These carriers have
focused their lobbying on this issue for business reasons. But the ICC
and state inspectors consider gypsy bus firms a social nuisance as well
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as a business threat. (The firms are prevalent on routes to and from
gaming resorts in Nevada and elsewhere.)85
Greyhound has similar concerns about illegal competition on the
intrastate portion of some routes. Attacking the ICC's indifference to
the problem in a 1979 statement, the company claimed:
One major responsibility that the ICC has, but which it
virtually ignores, remains. Carriers not meeting the
statutory standards must not be permitted to operate if
the travelling public is to be protected against unin-
sured, unsafe operators. The Commission has the
authority today to stop such carriers, of which there
are many, but refuses to act in a meaningful manner.
With deregulation, this responsibility should be given
to an agency with the dedication necessary to achieve
compliance with the law. The travelling public is
deserving of this protection.86
Charter firms that are currently required to cross-subsidize un-
profitable scheduled routes (or who at least claim they are) have
stressed that freedom of exit provisions should go into effect before
free entry is allowed to new, all-charter applicants. This would give
established charter operators the first opportunity to expand into
new markets. A phased-in deregulation of this sort would form a public
reward for past service to these firms, in a sense. Their request
seems fair, or honorable, by the same standards that might apply to
senior employees in a firm. They have already "paid their dues" and
should not be thrown out on the street.
These arguments are compelling, and indeed difficult for Congress-
men to resist. The firms may sense that Congress will place the ethic
of fair competition ahead of both the lawless market--represented here
by the unscrupulous outfits--and the potential advantages of cream-
skimming to new consumer groups. Serious federal attention to their
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concerns in the context of this legislation illustrates the grip that
business fairness arguments hold on the whole debate. Small bus firms
have been accusing the ICC of overlooking illegal operations for years. 87
But now that bus regulation is receiving renewed attention, the safety
and fitness arguments seem to take on more importance.
The small tour-oriented carriers also seek more liberal tour reg-
ulation. In this they have formed alliances with related industries.
Hotel, resort, and other tourism lobby organizations have joined forces
with bus industry groups to demand freer entry for bus tour brokers.
(Tour brokers provide bus transportation under contract by assigning
vehicles according to tour demand.) In the past, the ICC has viewed
them with suspicion since they can jeopardize cross-subsidized opera-
tions.88
Other uses of rationales
Bus carriers have used social need arguments as ballast in other
policy debates besides deregulation. In the 1979 gasoline shortage, for
instance, Greyhound, Trailways, and 16 other carriers petitioned the
ICC for temporary relaxed entry standards so that they could supple-
ment excess demand along each others' routes. Although Greyhound ob-
jected to Trailways' entry onto some of its routes, the ICC granted
this permission to both of the large carriers. Greyhound operated on
several routes previously controlled by Trailways for three months. 90
The carriers were able to make hay out of the energy crisis, using un-
committed charter vehicles on scheduled routes. The ICC's actions
demonstrated both a concern for a short-term social need, and careful
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attention to the ethic of business equity, since temporary authority was
distributed among the firms.
The bus industry as a whole uses a business fairness argument in
lobbying for better treatment vis a vis other modes. Once the indus-
try's potential contribution to the goal of energy conservation was
recognized, during the fuel shortage of 1974, the industry began to
request special consideration. Congress and the Department of Trans-
portation had generally ignored the bus industry, focusing far more
legislation and administrative resources on Amtrak and the airlines.
In 1981, the Department of Transportation had no staff group to attend
to bus industry issues, for instance. Since the industry was
beginning to experience declining profits, it is likely that industry
leaders saw the late 1970s as a timely opportunity to win some new
concessions. In 1978,
In recognition of the fuel efficiency of the intercity bus
industry, Congress reduced the excise tax on intercity bus
carriers.92
In 1979, the Department of Transportation funded a cooperative research
program with Greyhound to develop an especially fuel-efficient gas
turbine engine.93 And in 1979, the industry received special exemptions
from diesel fuel taxes. 94
Business fairness makes a powerful argumentfor increased bus
industry subsidies in addition to increased attempts at evenness--how-
ever interpreted--in regulatory reform. Greyhound and the ABA launched
*
In part, this was due to the perception that the busses were self-
sufficient private firms, while Amtrak was a quasi-public operation and
the airlines received heavy federal subsidies.
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a campaign during the late 1970s against "unfair government subsidies"
to Amtrak. (For instance, Greyhound sued Amtrak for arbitrarily low
fares. 95) Although Amtrak does cut into potential bus revenues on some
routes such as the Northeast Corridor, the threat to bus profits was
not the main motivation for this campaign. The ICC had already granted
bus firms permission to reduce fares on short notice in corridors where
Amtrak presented significant competition. (The agency has since ex-
tended this short-notice provision to routes where air fares fall below
corresponding bus fares.) Instead, when the bus industry argues for
equal treatment, as the ABA did in its 1980 annual report, the main
concern is not actually unfair competition in the transportation market,
but government favoritism. Bus industry lobbyists repeatedly stress
that their competitors use federally funded terminals, while they must
provide their own. During the late 1970s, the government began to re-
dress the so-called imbalance, albeit modestly, by funding several
mixed-mode transportation terminals under the Urban Development Action
Grants (UDAG) program.96 While the future of the new bus programs is
uncertain, it is likely that the federal government will continue to
pay more attention to the bus industry--as an industry--even after de-
regulation.
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CONCLUSIONS
The variety of rationales, and the central influence of business
equity among them, make a compromise deregulation solution likely. But
what problem will this "solution" address? It is unlikely to solve the
problem of declining demand in the scheduled portion of the industry
(if indeed that is a problem of any concern to the public). Exit free-
doms may boost operating margins for Greyhound, and entry relaxation is
likely to result in more lucrative charter operations. Deregulation
may thus postpone the next occasion for a hearing on the bus industry's
financial position. But the main problem it addresses is that of
satisfying a general clamor for regulatory reform, without unduly dis-
rupting established privileges. Some market-oriented improvements in
service patterns may be forthcoming, and the industry may improve its
position marginally. Ironically, both pro-business and pro-consumer
positions in the debate reduce to the maintenance of status quo elements
in the original bargain between industry and the regulators.
Although the Congressional verdict is not out yet, the House bill
provides evidence that government's mediating role will not end with
the passage of a deregulation law. The law would not provide a uniform
preemption of state route authority, but would leave substantial dis-
cretion to the ICC. State exit restrictions would be subject to ICC
oversight. Carriers wishing to enter or abandon markets could go over
state regulators to the ICC by showing that states had denied or re-
fused to act on their petitions.96 The ICC must make a finding, or
else the permission is automatic. The ICC thus would serve as a court
of appeals.
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The bill defines national bus policy as the
promotion of a competitive and efficient bus service and
the development of a cooperative approach to federal and
state regulation of intercity buses. 97
The bill directs the ICC to grant permits unless it finds a proposal
"inconsistent with the public interest." The definition of the public
interest is broadened from "necessity and convenience" to include the
effects on "small communities" and energy use. But policy would con-
tinue to be defined on a caseload, adversarial basis.
The burden of proof as to whether proposals meet the public inter-
est is shifted to the protesting party. This would perpetuate the ad-
versarial definition of public interest.-in contrast to either a plan-
ning or market concept of it. The shift seems likely to make it
harder for consumers outside of "small communities" to successfully
appeal their cases. New entrants are also likely to be swamped with
litigation when they challenge established carriers' franchises. (How-
ever, the bill does provide expedited procedures for carriers wishing
to enter markets where no other bus services exist.)98
The House bill contains a provision designed to help
prevent efficient companies from being crippled by new
carriers' attempting to skim off the most lucrative
business.99
This clause prohibits the ICC from granting either charter or
scheduled route permits if the new service would "damage the ability of
other bus companies to provide a substantial portion of their regular-
route service."100 The ICC would have to define criteria for these
findings.
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Bus firms' arguments for fair treatment crowd the public roster,
generally excluding consumer concerns that are not immediately compa-
tible with some strong position carriers take. Industry-minded
consultants and outside analysts have tried in vain to introduce al-
ternative formulations of the consumer side of deregulation, which
they seem to believe will help influence Congressmen. For instance,
one consultant suggests that if states are concerned about losing
needed rural bus routes, they should consider creating their own low-
cost transportation programs for those areas. (These might, for
instance, use smaller vehicles and local labor and repair services,
providing an additional local benefit.)101 One study points out that
exit prohibitions on rural routes may have discouraged formation of
innovative private sector services in those locations.102
Congress has never investigated alternative means for providing
the consumer benefits which bus industry regulation is supposed to up-
hold. It has not even attempted to document those benefits. Congress
has not, for instance, sponsored any major analytical research on the
transportation needs of bus riders, as it has for airline and Amtrak
passengers. State governments do not generally make forecasts of bus
demand or user needs. Hearings at both the state and federal levels
reveal a limited understanding of the functions bus services provide.
For instance, repeated emphasis on the number of locations served--a
favorite industry statistic--obscures the issue of whether the services'
schedules and destinations actually correspond to the trips rural
residents would like to make.
In the House bill, the shift, in the burden of proof to protesting
parties is troubling, since preparing cases against service cutbacks is
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an expensive process. But more troubling, perhaps, is the very narrow
equation of consumer interests with insurance requirements and the
established bus services of rural communities. The bus industry and the
ICC seem to have decided that bus insurance coverage is a more important
social concern than entry flexibility. Discussions of the "gypsy bus
problem" rarely raise the possible consumer advantages of a much less
regulated service which could potentially prove innovative and useful.
The same uncertainty arises with respect to "cream-skimming."
Cream-skimming is the sort of result envisioned by advocates of total
deregulation, when they use the less pejorative terms "highest use" or
"most efficient investment." But in actual practice, this free-market
vocabulary is generally set aside for fair-market rationales. What in
theory is most efficient becomes most unfair. Whether cream-skimming
in the bus industry constitutes a threat or a boon to consumers is un-
certain. It hasn't been actively discussed, and relevant data on the
cross-subsidies involved have not been collected. As noted in the
earlier discussion of Greyhound's position, the only terms used to dis-
cuss the consumer impacts of free entry, are the abstract virtues,
"efficiency" and "carrier fitness." For discussion of the merits and
dangers of cream-skimming to pass beyond these simple ideologies prob-
ably requires a more active role for consumers in the proceedings, and
a more thorough assessment of their needs.
The prognosis is equally uncertain for realizing the other consumer
virtues--and avoiding the consumer dangers--that industry's political
categories have created. The business fairness issue may be relevant
to consumer welfare, but it is hard to interpret it from a consumer
viewpoint. For instance, the dominant firms, Greyhound and Trailways,
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that argue for continued "seniority rights" may in fact be able to pro-
vide better interconnecting bus service on a nationwide basis than
other firms. This advantage could outweigh the problem their duopoly
poses for other firms in the industry. But in order to investigate
the question, it would be necessary to establish whether or not inter-
connecting nationwide service is a prominent consumer concern, more
central for example than frequent regional service, which could demand
different scheduling priorities. And from a business viewpoint, recent
evidence suggests Greyhound and Trailways may have made strategic er-
rors by focusing for too long on long-distance service when regional
short-distance markets could have been more profitable. 104 As airlines
improved and average auto trip distances increased, the bus mode's rel-
ative advantage has shifted towards intermediate or regional markets.
One economist suggests Greyhound would have done better to compete for
intraregional auto travelers than interregional air travelers. 105 if
fuel prices and driving distances continue to rise in future years, up-
graded regional bus service might find significant markets among mod-
erate-income auto-owning households, for instance.
Bus companies might benefit more from government-assisted market
research than from some of the provisions in the House bill. They
could attempt to expand service among new demographic segments, with
relatively minor changes in route regulation. If terminal locations
were liberalized, for instance, they might attempt to serve the growing
number of low and moderate-income households now living in suburban
areas, who do not consider taking the bus because of poor connections
to downtown terminal locations. Current regulations make this type of
adjustment difficult. But the deregulation process has not picked up
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on these alternatives, nor have Congress or the Department of Transpor-
tation actively studied them.
The bus industry has valued route regulation from a very narrow,
company perspective which does not necessarily coincide with the over-
all interests of either the industry or the public. The heritage of
regulation is a relatively static set of business benefits, and a
narrow perspective from which it is difficult to isolate business and
consumer concerns. To the extent that these mesh, the continued over-
sight of the ICC and Congress make a favorable outcome possible. The
emerging reform legislation does not, however, represent a departure
from the narrow conceptual framework for considering intercity bus ser-
vices, any more than it overthrows historic patterns of business
privilege and denial. The existing view of the industry does not rest,
however, on a single piece of ideology. Bus company officials choose
their arguments--and hence fashion those of the public--from a variety
of ideological themes without consistency over time or by place, ac-
cording to interests of the moment. Any improvement in our ability to
judge regulatory reform proposals will require a capacity to get be-
hind the industry manipulation of themes, and redress the lack of basic
knowledge about who the industry serves, and how well.
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CHAPTER TWO:
DEREGULATION OF THE U.S. FREIGHT RAILROAD INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
Railroad deregulation, like bus deregulation, has not been a uni-
linear rollback of past regulations. Instead, despite the sweeping
implications of the term deregulation, the regulatory reforms under-
taken have been highly selective. In a series of reforms since the
late 1960s, Congress, the ICC, and the Department of Transportation
have removed some former obligations and legal rights from railroad
managers. while leaving others intact.
The selective reforms have, furthermore, been only partially cum-
ulative in their effect. Reforms initiated during one administration
have on occasion been repealed, either by subsequent legislation, or by
modifications in the way the reforms are implemented. For instance,
Congress voted in 1976 to permit railroads to set seasonally-variable
rates. The rates accomodated fluctuations in rail demand, as at har-
vest time, and when new model automobiles leave Detroit. 1 But in 1980,
when Congress passed the most comprehensive rate deregulation bill to
date (the Staggers Act), it removed the authority for seasonal rates. 2
In an administrative example, the Carter administration, which pro-
moted a particularly radical form of deregulation, interpreted the
Stagger's Act liberally for the railroads, allowing a variety of rate
innovations to go into effect. The Reagan administration, by contrast,
is reversing the direction taken by the Staggers Act. 3 (Several
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business leaders recently criticized Reagan ICC Chairman Reese Taylor,
Jr., for "regulating the rail industry again," as a favor to the Team-
sters. 4) Thus rail deregulation, in addition to being selective, has
a forward and backward motion: it takes place in a fluid economic and
political environment, and can be reshaped at numerous points.
Over the past ten years, the rail industry's own lobbying fre-
quently determined when reductions in railroads' legal obligations
would be contemplated, and how the reforms would be discussed. Through
a series of administrative and legislative actions which have altered
a long, stable tradition of government involvement, the industry main-
tained its own perspective on what specific changes were desirable.
Railroads lobbied the ICC and Congress through their chief trade group,
the Association of American Railroads (AAR), as well as individually
when firms' interests diverged. Both the AAR and individual railroads,
especially large ones, were successful in positioning issues on the
regulatory agenda, playing on popular views of the industry. Rail
managers selectively promoted several key themes, notably the theme of
financial crisis, to advance their positions, and they often persuaded
the ICC, the DOT, and Congress to adopt their own construction of the
problems that policies should address.
The rail policy reforms that have emerged over the decade are
difficult to evaluate, both individually and in sum. Whether each re-
form constitutes good public policy is, of course, partly a matter of
definition. For instance, one criterion of good rail policies might be
that they produce low transportation costs; another would be efficient
pricing, to avoid unnecessary and fuel-wasting movement of goods. A
third common definition, often implic-it although infrequently articula-
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ted, is maximum preservation of the rail network. According to this
view, rail-dependent firms and their employees deserve continued ser-
vice according to status quo location patterns, since the firms have
made investments in the faith that adequate rail service was a per-
manent fixture of the landscape. Another frequent definition of the
public welfare in railroad regulation is expressed as the need for
some minimum level of profits, usually unspecified. In addition to
the mixture of criteria one might adopt, the complex nature of the
railroad industry has made it particularly difficult to predict and
evaluate policy outcomes, in comparison with many other regulated in-
dustries. Policies undertaken at one time or with respect to specific
railroads were certain to interact with regulatory changes made sub-
sequently, so that the sume effect could not always be anticipated.
The variety of criteria and predictive difficulties in evaluating
rail policy are not, however, necessarily the most important problems
confronting policy analysts who attempt to assess rail deregulation.
Equally or more important are the conceptual limitations imposed on
those who would analyze and act on the issues by railroad managers and
lobbyists. While the public merit of rail deregulation in its current
form is ambiguous, it is clear that the terms for public debate over
deregulation were largely set by railroad companies with the greatest
lobbying resources and the most at stake. These firms typically man-
aged to color the public view of the issues to suit their own interests.
This discussion will explore the industry's success in getting
the government to see railroads' obligations and opportunities in the
industry's own terms, throughout the past decade. A brief profile of
the industry and an overview of the regulatory tradition will establish
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the context for discussing the reform agenda.
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RAIL INDUSTRY PROFILE
Markets
Railroads transport five principal commodities: coal, grain,
bulk metals and minerals, and chemicals.5  In 1980, coal accounted for
35 percent of rail traffic on a tonnage basis. Also important are
forest products, paper pulp, cement, motor vehicles, and auto parts.6
Railroads transported 37 percent of freight traffic (in ton-miles) in
1980. The modes' shares of traffic for selected years are shown in
Table 5.
Industry structure
In 1980, of approximately 500 railroad companies, 40 had revenues
of over $50 million each. These companies transported 98 percent of
total railroad traffic, operated 94 percent of rail mileage, and ac-
counted for 92 percent of the workers employed by all railroad com-
panies.7 Table 6 shows the revenues of the 13 largest railroads in
1980 and 1981.
Financial performance
The railroad industry's financial performance is varied. In gen-
eral, railroads in the coal, grain, and paper pulp markets have exper-
ienced higher profits in the last few years than those transporting
manufactured goods. Midwestern railroads with traffic tied to auto-
mobile manufacturing have suffered the largest recent decline.
In 1980, the industry's estimate of its rate of return on net in-
vestment was 4.25 percent for the 40 railroads that dominate the in-
dustry. This was the highest level reached in 25 years. The increase
Table 5: Mode shares of freight ton-miles, historic and recent
1929
Mode
Railroads
Trucks
Waterways
Oil pipelines
Air cargo
Total ton-miles
(billions)
74.9
3.3
17.4
4.4
1950
56.2
16.3
15.4
12.1
1970
39.8
21.3
16.4
22.3
0.2
607
1974
38.6
22.3
16.1
22.8
0.2
1980
37.3
22.6
16.9
23.0
0.2
1,063 1,936 2,215 2,497
Source: Association of American Railroads, Yearbook of Railroad
Facts, 1981
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Table 6: Railroad revenue, 1980 and 1981 (millions)
Railroad 1980 1981
Union Pacific $4,872 $6,381
Missouri Pacific 2,237 2,524
Southern 1,637 1,790
Norfolk & Western 1,576 1,801
Burlington Northern 3,954 4,936
CSX 4,841 5,432
Southern Pacific 2,860 3,272
Santa Fe 3,215 3,366
Kansas City Southern 323 386
Chicago & North Western 936 982
Illinois Central Gulf 4,142 4,195
Denver & Rio Grande 350 388
Conrail 3,358 --
Source: Barron's, April 19, 1982, and Moody's Transportation Manual,
1981
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was due to record volumes of coal and grain traffic.8 Since 1975, the
industry's rate of return indicator has been low and erratic, as shown
in Table 7. Railroads in the Eastern District, which encompasses much
of the Midwest as wells lost money throughout the period.
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Table 7: Rate of return on rail investment
1975-1980, by rail district
United States
1.20%
1.60
1.24
1.52
2.87
4.25
Eastern
deficit
deficit
deficit
deficit
deficit
0.07%
Source: AAR Yearbook of Railroad Facts, 1981
*
net railway operating income as a percent of net investment in
transportation property, less interest, plus working capital
** includes Conrail; does not include Amtrak
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Western
3.98%
4.63
5.23
5.17
5.38
6.33
Southern
2.65%
3.57
3.71
4.22
4.38
5.43
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CHANGING CLIMATE
The railroad industry has experienced two major context changes
since the 1960s, both of which affected the outlook for regulatory
reform. The first was a series of major bankruptcies in the Northeast
and Midwest, and the second was expansion in the markets for coal and
grain transportation. These events took place against a backdrop of
overall decline in the industry's market position, relative to trucks,
and a loss of traffic in regions where service industries have replaced
transport-intensive raw materials, agriculture, or manufacturing as the
predominant economic activity. Commonting on the decline of North-
eastern railroads, U.S. Representative James Florio aptly stated that
in
"New Jersey, now our number one industry is drugs and
number two is tourism. Research and deve opment is a
major industry, and you don't ship that."
The decline of the railroad industry is not a recent development.
Railroads have been considered a declining industry since the 1930s.
(The system peaked in size in the 1920s at 250,000 miles, and is cur-
rently operating over approximately 200,000 miles. ) The industry is
heavily tied to the commodities business cycle, so attempts to quantify
the decline with time-series data can be misleading. But one rough
indicator, employment, has shrunk by two-thirds during the post-war
period. Despite the shrinkage, the industry is regarded as having an
overcapacity of both track and personnel. 12
As Table 5 showed, the railroads' share of domestic intercity
freight ton-miles fell from 74.9 percent in 1929 to 37.3 percent in
1980.13 The trucking industry made up most of the difference. Absolute
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rail tonnage has been fairly stable since World War II, but its compos-
ition has shifted towards denser commodities, that move only at rela-
tively low rates. Hence, the decline would be greater if stated in
terms of revenue market shares.
Besides improvements in trucking service and the reduced signifi-
cance of heavy manufacturing in the U.S., other destabilizing trends
have included the development of synthetic materials that require less
transportation, and the regional decentralization of the U.S. economy.
Decentralization makes it harder for railroads to balance large volumes
of two-way traffic over their fixed routes. 14
The Eastern railroads' position grew relatively worse as rail-
roads lost their market in general manufactures and became more de-
pendent on raw materials and export grains located elsewhere. Demo-
graphic shifts may also have contributed to the relative position of
the region's railroads. 15 A series of railroad bankruptcies, beginning
with the Penn Central Railroad in 1970, prompted public recognition of
the relative decline of Northeastern and Midwestern railroads. Rail-
road bankruptcies have been common since the industry's early years,
but the Penn Central was the largest bankruptcy case in U.S. history. 16
Other major bankruptcies in the region included the Boston and Maine
in 1970, the Reading Railroad in 1971, the Erie Lackawanna in 1972,
and the Rock Island Railroad in 1979.17
Although the overall impression is still one of a declining in-
dustry, individual railroads have maintained, and increased, their
profits throughout the past two decades. The Southern Railway, for
instance, continued to invest in new technology and acquired high-
volume markets for grain and other products while Northeastern and
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Midwestern railroads were disinvesting. More recently, the industry has
experienced significant increases in demand for coal transportation.
(Over 60 percent of U.S. coal is hauled by rail. 18 ) The federal gov-
ernment helped to establish an increased domestic market for utility
coal in 1978 legislation requiring conversion of oil-and gas-fired
electric plants. The coal export market has also grown significantly
(see Table 8).
Short-term changes in rail finances also shape the policy-making
context, in conjunction with the longer-term events discussed above.
Long-run decline typically produces its most visible signals, such as
near-bankruptcies, during off-years (either recessions, or years with
major strikes or embargoes). Short-term traffic increases (often one-
time occurrences), conversely, produce hopeful signals to policy-makers
concerned about rail profitability. For instance, the year of the
Soviet grain deal and the termination of the United Mine Worker's
strike--which added much of one year's expected coal shipment to the
next--were heralded as "growth years" for railroads. 19 Since it is
difficult for policy-makers to sort out foreground and background
trends, especially on a firm-by-firm basis , the industry has little
trouble arguing that it needs regulatory or legislative relief, when-
ever any dip in volume or revenues arises. In addition to regional
bankruptcies and new bulk commodities markets, inflation represents
another climatic change which has affected the railroad industry's reg-
ulatory agenda. The development of chronic inflation, beginning in
1967, altered the context for rail rate-making, which in the absence of
inflation was a very conservative process.
Table 8: U.S. Coal
Domestic
Consumption, 1977-1980 (million tons)
1977
Electric utilities
Coking Coal
General Industry & Retail
Exports
Canada
Overseas
Total Domestic & Export
476
77
67
17
37
691
1978
480
71
70
15
25
654
1979
526
77
74
19
46
776
Source: Connie Holmes, Coal Exporters
Association, December 1980
Association and National Coal
*
In 1978, both supply and demand were depressed due to coal
strikes.
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1980
565
73
77
19
65
825
and rail
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REGULATION: HISTORIC PRACTICES
The rail industry and the federal government challenged three main
areas of regulatory practice in the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s:
service abandonment (or exit) regulations, rate regulation, and merger
guidelines. Not all aspects of railroad regulation went through an
upheaval, however. In addition to these three regulatory elements,
the ICC has also traditionally monitored railroad operations in con-
siderable detail. Operating requirements include, for example,
technological standards to facilitate interchange of equipment among
railroads, and detailed provision for the movement of freight cars
around the rail network.20 The ICC also provides railroad accounting
standards.
Most of the rail regulations derive from the Interstate Commerce
Act, and from ICC precedent in implementing the Act. Many rules pre-
date the 20th century. The full set of rail regulations supports what
is called the "common carrier" system of rail transport. The term com-
mon carrier designates the regulatory principle that railroad service
should be available to all potential users at a standard price. Al-
though this principle has never been fully realized, over time the ICC
developed an extremely elaborate set of rules, intended to approximate
this condition. The nature and origin of the common carrier require-
ments are too complex to develop here, but a thumbnail sketch is nec-
essary to understand the railroads' motives for eliminating some of
them and preserving others. In essence, the rules require that rail-
roads operate in an interdependent, rather than autonomous, manner, and
that status quo services and traffic handling arrangements be maintained
unless specific proposals are made to change them.
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Service regulation
Service regulation consists of two main guarantees, each supported
by a battery of detailed, technical rules. The first is a guarantee of
service to shippers, and the second is a guarantee of mutual cooperation
among railroads where coordination is required , or supposedly required,
to back up the first guarantee. Under the common carrier principle,
railroads cannot refuse to carry goods if a customer can pay the rate.
Railroads are not permitted to abandon service on any line without first
petitioning for ICC approval. Even in bankruptcy, a railroad is not
permitted to cease operations or abandon low-volume lines without ICC
approval. Exist or abandonment cases have often entailed protracted
hearings. 21
In the common carrier tradition, railroads are not only required
to serve all customers until further notice, but to cooperate with each
other in order to do so. They must, for instance, haul each others'
traffic without discrimination when specified by the ICC, and in some
cases, they must make special trips to pick up and return another line's
freight cars which would otherwise be stranded at their destination. 22
Much rail traffic moves over several firms' lines, often creating con-
flicts over what routing pattern will be followed (for example, when
two of the companies have duplicate facilities over a segment of the
route). Another very frequent kind of conflict involves the share of
revenues to each participating railroad , known as the "divisions."
The ICC has devoted considerable attention throughout its history to
adjudicating divisions conflicts, and continues to do so today. Al-
*
Of course, by setting rates high, or failing to make freight cars
available on a timely basis, railroads can occasionally refuse unprofit-
able traffic.
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most any type of rail case has the potential to turn into a divisions
dispute, since any changes in service or rates potentially affect rail-
roads' relative portion of jointly-handled traffic. Divisions adjust-
ments are sometimes used to compensate a railroad that expects to lose
traffic after the change.23  The ICC also specifies which parties--
railroads, shippers, or receivers of goods--have authority over routing
decisions.
Merger guidelines
In the merger area, the ICC developed a set of guidelines based on
precedent, and codified in 1950, which provide that weaker and/or smaller
lines be incorporated in the merged system, to ensure their continued
operation after the merger. In some cases, parties wishing to merge
were required to purchase smaller, low-profit lines. In others, the
ICC imposed protective conditions, requiring merging railroads to
guarantee previous routing arrangements, or to allow weaker lines the
right to use their track. Two standard protective conditions, for
instance, are as follows:
0 The present traffic and operating relationships.. .shall be
continued whenever possible.
0 The promptness and frequency of handling of all cars shall
be without discrimination. 24
The conditions ostensibly protect shippers located on vulnerable lines.
This usually occurs, however, only as a by-product of the railroads'
internal negotiation. A railroad with a costly or circuitous route,
for instance, may fear that its now more efficient, merged competitor
will take over its former share of traffic. By requesting a guaranteed
traffic share after the merger, the vulnerable railroad may be in a
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good position to continue service to local points on the line. But the
conditions are specified, and applied, from the point of view of fair
treatment of railroad companies.25 The ICC has imposed the 1950 con-
ditions in numerous merger cases since then. Because negotiating a
satisfactory resolution of railroads' requests for conditions is a
delicate process, until recently the ICC often took years to weigh the
evidence of competing parties in merger cases. 26
Rate Regulation
The ICC does not set rail rates, but may approve or deny proposed
changes over a base structure. The basic rate structure has a very
long tradition, since its main outlines evolved prior to the ICC's in-
ception in 1887.27 In its regulation of rail rates, the ICC has been
described as a "monitoring system supervising a cartel." 28  Railroads
have had a major hand in regulating their own rates, working through a
hierarchical network of rate bureaus (legal price-setting boards). The
bureaus publish official tariff (rate) books, and perform both adminis-
trative and lobbying services for their members. Congress held the
rate bureaus exempt from anti-trust law, on the grounds that the ICC
was better equipped than the Department of Justice to correct any
problems of monopoly power.29 The AAR presides at the top of the rate
bureau pyramid. The AAR maintains contact with all of the bureaus,
compiles their government paperwork, and testifies for the railroads in
a variety of rate cases involving more than one company.
Rate regulation originated on the state level, and was gradually
introduced at the federal level during the early years of the ICC. 30
Early state regulation (as in the case of intercity busses) tended to
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be more exacting than federal regulation. States were concerned with
protecting local shippers against high railroad rates. But as rail-
roads found state regulations increasingly burdensome in the early
1900s, they successfully pressured the federal government to preempt
much of the states' power over rates. State preemption took place
gradually during the Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson administrations. 31
During this period, the ICC became a forum for routine rate and
divisions conflicts between railroads. The ICC's role as arbiter was
later extended to intermodal disputes, when Congress passed the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935. The Act provided standards for "fair competition"
between railroads and trucking firms. After its passage, the rail
common carrier system had to coexist with similar systems in the other
regulated modes. The increasingly complex ICC roster ultimately
guaranteed a fuller hearing to industry viewpoints than to those of
the general public.32 As early as Theodore Roosevelt's presidency,
Gabriel Kolko states that the ICC had
"broken into a routinized pattern of adjudicating the
problems of the railroad industry without concern for
the larger interest of a public not immediately involved
in the day-to-day issues preoccupying the railroads,
Commission, and wealthier shippers."33
Both in the early period of rate regulation and more recently,
many rail rates have been established outside the regulatory process;
they are worked out informally between railroads and their customers.
The ICC only becomes involved if someone protests a rate change. The
ICC criteria for judging rate cases are complex and contradictory.
According to the Interstate Commerce Act, rail rates were historically
prohibited from giving undue preference to
79
any particular person, company, firm, corporation,
association, locality, port, port district, gateway,
transit point, region, district, or territory.34
The original purpose of the law was to prevent railroads from develop-
ing selective relationships with individual shippers, that could lead
them away from the common carrier principle of availability.35 For
this reason, the ICC also prohibited railroads from offering contract
rates or discounts to shippers. In actual practice, it is virtually
impossible for any change in a rail rate to live up to these require-
ments. The ICC therefore has had significant discretion, sometimes
following its own precedent, and often justifying its decisions with a
post hoc selection from the repertoire of possible prohibitions men-
tioned above.
The rate picture is complicated further by detailed ICC case-law
concerning the relationship of rail and truck rates. Rail rates are
required to cover marginal costs, although determination of marginal
costs is often another matter for protracted ICC hearings. Until re-
cently, the ICC was required to consider whether or not a proposed rate
would undercut truck traffic. 36
The traditional system of rate-making has produced two main forms
of cross-subsidy: 1) between railroads (when traffic is handled joint-
ly), and 2) between competing shippers, who may for historic reasons
pay different rates for similar services. The extent and magnitude of
either form of cross-subsidy throughout the industry has not been de-
termined.37
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The ambiguous public value of the regulatory system
The three components of common carrier regulation that were par-
tially dismantled in the 1970s--service requirements, rates, and mer-
ger conditions--have an important common feature. Because of rail-
roads' widespread interdependence and the keen competition between
rail users, regulations of each type typically protect one set of
shippers' and railroads' interests, while threatening others. Service
requirements, for instance, protect shippers located on existing rail
lines, and they also ensure that customary connections for jointly-
handled freight movements are maintained. (The latter benefit accrues
primarily to the connecting railroad, and the major lines dependent on
it.) And as mentioned earlier, a rail merger fashioned under the ICC's
conventional guidelines may protect status quo service competition, by
keeping traditional choices available to shippers. However, the con-
ditions are framed in such a way as to protect existing traffic pat-
terns, and benefit individual railroads.
Deregulation in any form is likely to alter the balance between
competing or mutually dependent railroads, and between competing ship-
pers. As in any routine rate case, a change in the guidelines for
rate-making may result in some shippers losing their markets, if the
price or service differential between them and their competitors in-
creases. Hence, if a railroad wishes to propose a change--a merger, a
rate increase or reduction, or a change in revenue divisions--it is
always possible to bill the change as one which will "aid shippers by
creating more competition," or "promote efficiency," or enhance some
other generic attribute of a good railroad system. Yet the same
change may reduce competition or efficiency elsewhere in the transpor-
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tation system. Hence, most departures from regulatory tradition--both
routine and structural--have an ambiguous outcome for rail-using firms,
competing railroads, and the general public. Further, because of this
ambiguity, there is in the history of rail regulation a pronounced
tendency for railroads, and the ICC as well , to use the terms competi-
tion, efficiency, and service without analysis, and without admitting
that their definitions are narrowly applied to one set of firms and
not another. Both sides in almost any rail dispute can utilize one or
more of these catch-words to advance either a change, or maintenance of
the status quo. The same unspecified terms that appeared in traditional
rate, merger, and abandonment cases have occupied key intellectual pos-
itions in recent debates over deregulation.
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DEREGULATION: THE REFORM AGENDA
The following sections examine a series of regulatory changes
which have taken place in the railroad industry since 1970. In some
instances, the railroad industry (or specific firms) initiated regu-
latory changes, in response to a changing external context. In other
cases, the ICC or Congress first proposed a reform, intended to benefit
a broader segment of the population such as industrial or household
consumers. The railroads then sought influence over its development,
to promote what they considered a favorable outcome.
The timing of the railroads' participation in selective deregula-
ation initiatives suggests that in addition to the secular economic
developments described earlier (including bankruptcy and bulk transport
opportunities), the political climate was also an important motive for
reform attempts. Both economic and political changes contributed to
make the reforms--some of them long-desired--more necessary or more
feasible than previously.
As each of the reforms came under discussion, railroad companies
significantly shaped the terms of discussion, and often the policy out-
come as well. The industry's success in steering policy formation
stemmed from the use of lobbying arguments compatible with the public
opinion at the time. Some of the railroad managers' arguments are
similar to those that bus industry spokesmen made in order to promote
favorable provisions in the bus reform package. These include argu-
ments about business equity, energy conservation, and the industry's
*
Whether or not the outcome would be favorable to the industry in
the long run is another question.
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"underdog" status vis a vis other modes. Other rail rationales are
distinct. For example, the railroads frequently couched their posi-
tions in the rhetoric of imminent financial disaster.
The merit of the resulting policies for consumers, workers, and
the general public is uncertain. As noted at the start of this chapter,
a variety of useful criteria could be developed to evaluate the reforms,
given accurate impact predictions. Some of the regulatory changes
might result in more efficient prices, promote regional employment,
or create long-term investment capital, three frequently mentioned
policy goals. But Congress, the Department of Transportation, and the
ICC seldom undertook formal impact assessments of the reforms described
here, or their likely interactions. They seldom evaluated the policies
against broad social criteria of any sort, relying instead on an adver-
sarial definition of the public welfare, largely couched in industry
terms.
The regulatory reforms considered include 1) the legislative
formation of Conrail in 1973; 2) selective relaxation of rate regula-
tions during the period 1970-1976; 3) partial liberalization of mer-
ger conditions in the late 1970s, and 4) legislative reform of rail
rates in 1980. It should be noted that some of these reforms fall
outside the conventional meaning of the term deregulation, which often
refers to a formal, comprehensive legislative package, adopted "once
and for all." But on each occasion, railroads pressed for a selective
alteration in government obligations, creating and drawing on unexamined
popular arguments to bolster their position.
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Legislative formation of Conrail
One of the most important instances in which railroads promoted
selective deregulation, using popular themes, was the formation of
Conrail in 1973. The legislation establishing Conrail as a quasi-
private Northeastern railroad was not a regulatory reform measure, as
such. Rather, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act (or 3R Act) removed
most of the rail mileage in the Northeast, and much in the Midwest,
from the traditional exit and bankruptcy regulations in the Interstate
Commerce Act.
The 3R Act was formulated by general counsel to the Union Pacific
Railroad, in response to actions of the Penn Central trustees. The
trustees, concerned about their ability to repay creditors and extri-
cate themselves from railroad operations, proposed to abandon half of
the railroads' lines. They claimed that the bankrupt railroad would
"revive by itself" if the mileage were cut. The trustees claimed the
ICC was at fault for
forcing the railroad to keep these branch lines after
their usefulness had ended. 38
It is true that some of the branch lines had virtually no traffic at
the time of bankruptcy. Yet, as Richard Saunders points out, if half
of its system was useless, the Penn Central must have had an indication
of this before 1973. The Penn Central had not petitioned to abandon
many of the lines previously, despite opportunities to do so. The
company had even encouraged shippers to build or expand facilities
along some of the lines.39 And some lines were still valuable feeders
to the mainlines. 40  It appears that the Penn Central, a diversified
conglomerate with major real-estate holdings, had decided to disinvest
85
in its railroad operation, and saw an opportune occasion in 1973. Pub-
lic attention was at a high level due to the bankruptcy, and the pro-
spects for an ordinary income reorganization seemed limited.41
Since it would not have been possible for the trustees to put the
10,000 miles of lines through the ICC abandonment process all at once,
their goal was to deregulate the abandonments. This required legisla-
tive removal of the ICC's authority to block them. In 1973, the Penn
Central secured the cooperation of Judge Fulham, the bankruptcy court
judge responsible for the Penn Central case. Fulham declared a time
limit of 45 days during which a "Congressional solution to the Penn
Central crisis" must be found.42  If a solution was not forthcoming,
Fulham announced that he would order immediate liquidation of the entire
Penn Central property.
The Union Pacific came forth with a plan to create a national
corporation which would purchase and operate the Penn Central system,
and have the authority to cut out little-utilized mileage through plan-
ning (rather than regulation). The Union Pacific had a direct interest
in a federal subsidy to the lines:
The Union Pacific didn't want to lose the 25 percent of
its traffic that it sent to or received from the North-
east. It didn't want a free-for-all of southern and
western roads grabbing for pieces of the northeastern
network in case there should be a liquidation.43
The Nixon administration responded favorably to the Union Pacific plan,
despite concern that it might appear to be a precedent for nationaliza-
tion. The Department of Transportation adopted the trustees' notion
that by slashing railroad mileage, profits could be restored. Although
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the ICC contended that the plan was a piece of "wishful thinking,"
The DOT made no attempt to analyze if this were the
correct solution... Instead, the statement was simply
repeated, over and over, in the reports, in hearings
and to the press that students of transportation 44
agreed that slashing mileage was the proper solution.
John T. Fishwick, president of the Norfolk and Western Railway, agreed
with the ICC that the bankrupt railroads could not be revitalized
without massive financial aid. He was "particularly critical of the
suggestions in the original Conrail plan," estimating that federal ex-
penditure on the Contrail system "would be about double what the DOT
projected."45  Fishwick's criticisms were not purely methodological.
They reflected his concern that the federally subsidized railroad
would provide unfair advantages to Norfolk and Western's competitors. 46
But the forecasts, and the threat of cutting mileage, prevailed, and
the legislation was passed in time to avoid liquidation.*
While the trustees stressed the need for special government action
to bring the railroad out of its financial emergency, the Union Pacific
(now the most profitable U.S. railroad) claimed that government pur-
chase was essential to the economy of the northeast.48 Union
Pacific appeared interested in having the government absorb losses on
the Penn Central branch lines which it might otherwise have had to
purchase, or subsidize through revenue divisions. Both railroads as-
*
The DOT projections assumed a reversal, rather than further de-
cline, in the northeastern railroads' traffic base. And the 3R Act
budgeted only $250 million to cover the guaranteed lifetime incomes
awarded to the bill's labor supporters. DOT estimated that the $250
million would last "until the last protected employee retired," but
it was gone in four years.47
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serted the need for immediate government action. Little thought was
given to alternative forms of intervention, in part because the rail-
roads had created an artificial urgency via the bankruptcy court.
The 3R Act's selective deregulation did preserve some rail ser-
vices that might otherwise have been abandoned. The public value of
these services, as a group, was not scrutinized, however. The 3R Act
was probably not the most cost-effective manner for preserving the
lines, yet potentially more economical alternatives, such as coopera-
tive ownership or nationalization , were not debated. As a job preser-
vation program, the 3R Act was not assessed on a long-term basis. Sup-
porters cited the need to "save rail-dependent jobs," but Congress did
not investigate whether the branch lines would be preserved indefi-
nitely, or only on a stop-gap basis to justify a one-time subsidy.
The 3R Act is generally considered to have been a broad social
welfare measure, aimed at protecting rail-dependent Northeast employ-
ment, and the performance of the U.S. industrial economy. But its
success on both of these terms was uncertain. The railroads with the
greatest interest in partial deregulation of abandonment, and the
greatest ability to advocate that interest, shaped the agenda to their
own liking, by manipulating the themes of financial crisis, optimism,
and regional economic need.
Selective rate reform, 1970-1976
In addition to the 3R Act, rate regulation was another important
area of reform during the early 1970s. During this period, the federal
government and the AAR each attempted to reform different aspects of
rail rate regulation. The AAR's reforms generally succeeded, while
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most of Congress' reforms were perceived as failures. The ability of
the AAR to construe the issues to its members' advantage accounted, at
least in part, for the discrepancy. The AAR's target for change was
the historic rate structure, or the relative prices charged for haul-
ing different commodities. Congress, the DOT, and later the ICC itself,
focused instead on the railroads' continued collective rate-making
practices via their rate bureaus.
Although the rate bureaus still enjoyed anti-trust immunity, they
were increasingly perceived as illegitimate and outmoded. The ICC made
few investigations to determine the extent of the rate bureaus' collu-
sive powers or stabilizing function, so their continued existence was
of ambiguous merit from a national policy standpoint. The commodity
rate structure, likewise, had seldom been alayzed as a whole.49 But
the railroads' successful lobbying initiatives helped to prevent the
development of an appropriate methodology and research expertise, which
might have addressed the impacts of selective deregulation from a broad
public standpoint.
The AAR used a single rationale--financial crisis--both to promote
its rate structure reform and to resist reform of collective rate-making
practice. Thus, where rate regulation was concerned, financial crisis
was an all-purpose justification for implementing one form of deregula-
tion and avoiding another. In asserting the industry's own view of
what constituted appropriate deregulation, the AAR made use of the same
public concern over the Northeastern railroad bankruptcies discussed in
the previous section. However, unlike the Union Pacific or Penn Cen-
tral's lobbying for the Conrail program, the AAR sought to extend the
public impression of crisis to the whole industry.
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The external change motivating both government and industry
initiatives was the onset of chronic inflation. Congress had criti-
cized collective rail rate-making in the past. But inflation made
collective rate-making much more visible to Congress. Beginning in
1967, the industry had petitioned the ICC on a yearly basis for na-
tionwide percentage rate increases. These general increases were
designed to cover the effects of cost inflation quickly, without the
need for separate actions on each rate. (Use of the general increases
had been rare before 1967.) While in retrospect, the use of percentage
increases to adjust for inflation seems above controversy, in the late
1960s and early 1970s, when inflation was not yet viewed as a normal
state of affairs, it often appeared to Congressmen that the general
increases were an illegitimate use of ICC authority. Each general
increase case drew angry consti-tuent mail. (A typical complaint from
local shippers was that the railroads "should not have another general
increase because they just had one last year.") Congressmen were
also concerned about the inflationary effect of sudden nationwide rate
increases. 50
Congress put pressure on the ICC to de-emphasize the general rate
increase process, beginning in 1971. The ICC began to suggest that
railroads make up cost inflation on an individual basis, or at least
through local rate bureaus, rather than enmasse through the AAR. 51
The ICC's printed decisions on general rate increases, for instance,
exhorted the railroads to provide more detailed supporting data, so
that varying levels of need could be determined for different segments
of the industry. Railroads were instructed to
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stop depending on the general increase process and make
more use of selectively tailored rates.
In 1973, Congress formally required the ICC to collect a detailed
schedule of financial data by individual railroad before approving
any more general rate increases. The measure was intended as a disin-
centive, to discourage collective percentage increases. Although the
ICC threatened to enforce the reform, the industry resisted it, and
the ICC continued to grant increase petitions with the schedule left
blank. 52  In refusing to give up the collective practice, railroads
claimed that the delays involved in adjusting rates on an individual
basis would "cripple the industry."53 From a procedural point of view,
it would require continuous manual updating of the tariff books, and
"confuse shippers." Similarly, the AAR and a number of individual
railroads claimed that filing the more detailed financial and cost
data that the ICC sought in support of general increases "would present
an untenable financial hardship" in itself.54
The AAR used the same argument successfully in another setting.
State-level regulatory authorities still had some power over general
rate increases on intrastate rail traffic. The state commissioners
typically took much longer to approve inflation-related rate increases
than the ICC. 55 The AAR turned "intrastate rate lag" into a major
issue in 1974, again claiming an urgent need for revenues. Congress
responded with legislation to preempt most of the remaining state
autonomy. States would now have to decide general increase cases
within two months after the ICC announced each nationwide increase.
The reform posed an ironic contrast to Congress' other actions on
general increases, since it pegged the intrastate rates to the very
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structure Congress was trying to dismantle. But a fact the railroads
seldom mentioned throughout the intrastate lag campaign was that intra-
state traffic contributed less than one percent of total railroad
revenues. 56  In a true revenue emergency, this insignificant amount
would have made little difference to the railroads' standing.
Since the ICC would not act to command managerial reform through
paperwork rules, in 1976 Congress passed a more comprehensive piece of
legislation, again designed to wean railroads away from the nationwide
collective increases. In contrast to earlier efforts, this bill, the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4R Act), offered a
carrot rather than a stick. The Act provided several modest rate-
making freedoms, "to encourage more long-run cost sensitivity and
marketing" among the railroads. For instance, the ICC would approve
individual rate increases of up to 7 percent per year without petition,
and higher increases would be permitted, as long as the railroad did
not dominate the particular market. The bill also offered the railroads
a first opportunity to establish seasonal and peak-volume rates.57 But
the railroads utilized these innovations very sparingly, with the ex-
ception of the seasonal rates, and continued to rely on general in-
creases to offset inflation.
In order to create the impression that financial hardship re-
quired nationwide rate increases, the AAR exclusively submitted ag-
gregate cost and financial data in rate cases throughout the 1970s.
This led one critic to comment that the ICC was
rewarding railroad inefficiencies, creating a symbiotic
relationship between the needy East and greedy South...
The crux of the carriers' revenue case hinges upon the
demise of the Penn Central. 58
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Whether the general increases created more inefficiencies than indepen-
dent pricing would have done is not clear. But the Penn Central bank-
ruptcy did figure heavily in the AAR's rate testimony and the ICC's
printed decisions during the period. In 1971, for instance, the ICC
permitted an increase approximately 20 percent greater than any but
the Eastern railroads could justify with their cost submissions. The
ICC announced that all the carriers could use the increase
since the industry's financial condition is desperate...
One has only to look at the flow of red ink to see the
need for additonal revenue. 59
Although there is no question that the industry's rate of return (as
calculated by the AAR) was low throughout the country in 1971, financial
conditions varied. The evidence suggests that many Southern railroads,
including the Chessie and the Southern Railway, did not need the
increases and may have been using them to overcharge grain and paper
shippers.60 By focusing attention on an aggregate, generalized view
of the industry's financial hardship, the AAR successfully clung to its
regulatory prerogatives.
Just as inflation made reform of collective rates a more urgent
issue for Congress, it provided a natural opportunity for the AAR to
win routine exceptions from rate structure regulation. Many railroads
had long been interested in raising their rates on coal traffic, which
is primarily tied to the rail mode, and lowering them, further than
normally permitted, on commodities which could move by truck. The
former action was difficult in the absence of a strong argument for
rate relief, and the latter ran counter to the ICC's practice of pro-
tecting truck traffic from predatory rail rates. However, the superior
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financial performance of the trucking industry (again, on an aggregate
basis) during the period somewhat weakened the ICC's hand in trucking
protection as well.
In the new inflationary environment, and with the mood of urgency
described above, the AAR had an unprecedented opportunity to gradually
skew the rate structure, allowing rates on some commodities to rise
faster than others. A loophole in the general rate increase process,
known as the "hold-down," permitted the percentages to vary slightly
on specific commodities. The AAR used this loophole to instill varia-
tion in what were still considered uniform increases. By winning per-
mission for a higher overall increase than could be cost-justified, it
was possible for the railroads to raise less competitive rates by the
maximum percentage authorized, but hold others down below it, citing
the need to retain traffic on the competitive commodities. The hold-
down procedure was an old device, but in the context of rapid infla-
tion, the railroads could hope to increse the spread geometrically.
By 1972, along with each petition for a general increase, the AAR
filed a battery of exceptions or hold-downs to be applied to different
commodities. The American Trucking Association and the coal lobby
protested the practice and claimed it was an extension of rail cartel
power.61 But the allegations were not scrutinized. In the interest
of expediting the rate cases, to meet the carriers' "urgent revenue
need," the ICC began to cut short the period for shipper and trucking
testimony normally built into each rate case.62  (Testimony in rail
rate hearings was of two general types, each provided for by a sep-
arate section in the Interstate Commerce Act. In the first type, ship-
pers and other parties were permitted to protest unfair or prejudicial
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rate impacts on their particular traffic. In the second type of
testimony, they could only address the railroads' financial needs,
without reference to their own situation.) In two consecutive rate
cases, the AAR convinced the ICC that the need for rate relief was
too great to permit the customary rounds of testimony on prejudicial
industrial impacts. Issues of rate discrimination against particular
commodities and regions were thus excluded from the proceedings alto-
gether.63
The hold-down method of deregulating the rate structure did not
work as well in subsequent years. After 1974, the railroads were more
often denied the full increases they sought, which were now--at 12 or
15 percent annually--even more visible to Congress than in earlier
years. The AAR then began to petition openly for one base increase, and
a special, higher increase on coal. The ICC generally adjusted the lat-
ter figure downwards, but allowed it to remain above the base request.64
When utilities and coal interest protested the new arrangement, the ICC
again echoed the railroads' statements that the industry's revenue
needs were great, and the coal industry could stand the increase. The
AAR often spoke of the need for a higher contribution from coal, to
defray the costs of repairing railbeds in coal-hauling regions. The
AAR's position may have had merit, but the ICC failed to investigate
the claim.
Ultimately, the AAR won a legislative concession which institu-
tionalized the derugulated coal rates. The concession came in the 4R
Act. In addition to its modest selective rate provisions, the 4R Act
allowed the ICC
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for the first time to include as part of its rate-making
criteria whether a rate will assure a railroads' repay-
ment of debt, cover the effects of inflation and assure
raising of sufficiegt equity capital and a reasonable
or economic profit. 5
This new provision appeared to be aimed at coal rates, and the ICC used
the criteria when coal rates were under consideration. According to a
coal industry publication, some members of the House Commerce Sub-
committee on Oversight and Investigation criticized this provision as
a license to overcharge coal shippers:
Subcommittee sources say some members see this as a
profit enhancement measure, and wonder why the ICC
has applied adequacy of revenue criteria to coal
rates only. The staffers also admit they are ham-
pered because the ICC has apparently undertaken no
verification of the cost figures the railroads have
given the agency to justify their rate requests. 66
The AAR was able to win gradual deregulation of the rate structure,
while retaining the privilege of using rate bureaus. In each case, the
AAR successfully cultivated the impression that the industry's financial
status required selective deregulation. The first few years of chronic
inflation coincided with the wave of large bankruptcies, creating an
environment in which the AAR could claim the need for special excep-
tions. By the time the novelty of inflation had worn off, and the
sense of financial urgency had faded into one of chronic, predictable
revenue shortage, the railroads' selective deregulation had become the
new status quo.
The results of selective rate deregulation are difficult to
evaluate from a public policy or comsumer viewpoint, as suggested in
the quote above. Few commentators or analysts have advocated in-
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definite retention of the archaic rate structure, and the AAR's changes
may have brought rates on some commodities closer to costs. Likewise,
the ability of rate bureaus and their nationwide conduit to act as a
cartel may now be more circumscribed than critics imply. But the AAR's
ability to dominate the process of choosing which regulations to keep,
and which to remove, has excluded full consideration of these issues.
Implementation of liberalized mergers, 1978-1980
In 1976, the Carter administration's ICC Chairman, Daniel O'Neal,
offered to streamline the rail merger cases the agency had handled on
an adversarial regulatory basis since the 1940s. A 31-month time limit
was set for ICC merger proceedings. And the ICC said it would no long-
er insist on the inclusion of weaker lines in merged companies.67 The
rail industry had pressured for freer mergers for a long period, claim-
ing that excessive delays and restrictive conditions prevented the in-
dustry from consolidating to achieve cost reductions.68  But O'Neal's
announcement was not only a response to industry pressure: it also
formed part of a larger Carter-era regulatory reform movement, which
included the 4R Act discussed in the previous section. The AAR ap-
plauded O'Neal's decision, and several large railroads began to pre-
pare merger proposals.
The four main proposals were for what are called "end-to-end"
mergers, where two cooperating railroads merge lengthwise to extend
their distance coverage. (End-to-end mergers are distinct from
"parallel" mergers, in which former competitors combine to eliminate
duplicate track or yards.) The proposed mergers were as follows:
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* The Burlington Northern and the Frisco, to run from the
Pacific Northwest to Florida
* The Chessie System and Seaboard Industries, to form CSX,
a 27,000-mile network in the East
* The Norfolk and Western and the Southern Railway, to be
called Norfolk Western
* The Union Pacific, Missouri Pacific, and Western Pacific,
to be called PacRail
(The first two mergers took effect in 1980, the third in 1982. The
PacRail merger is still before the ICC. Industry analysts expect the
ICC to approve it soon.69 The mergers are likely to create a system
of 6 or 8 transnational railroads.)
In addition to the liberal environment for mergers, the railroads
involved found the prospect of large-scale mergers especially attrac-
tive at this time because of the growth of coal markets. The mergers
would allow capital pooling for high-risk investments in coal-hauling
facilities and other specialized equipment. They could also increase
coal marketing opportunities by providing direct links between the
mines and their markets. For instance, Burlington Northern viewed
its merger as an opportunity to sell more of the utility coal it owns
in the Wyoming Powder River Basin. Mergers also would reduce the
costs involved in interchanging freight cars between the merging lines.
(Interchange costs have become more significant as a result of longer
average distances on rail movements.) And the large railroads' ac-
celerating specialization in high-volume movements of bulk commodities
meant that mergers could help to balance increasingly lopsided traffic:
Mergers can help to stabilize the traffic and earnings
base for a railroad company with a limited number of
commodities subject to seasonal variations or unidirec-
tional movements. 71
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The mergers offered potential benefits to rail customers and
consumers, in the form of time-savings on long shipments. Long-
distance traffic, formerly shared among competitors over a segment of
the proposed merger corridor, could now be withdrawn from all but the
one railroad entering into the merger. 72 (Without a merger, this
traffic had to be parceled out among competitors through reciprocal
guarantees, backed by the ICC.) The resulting decline in traffic on
the duplicative roads could present a problem to local shippers and
their employees, however. Withdrawal of more lucrative long-distance
traffic could result in service abandonments, reducing these shippers'
transportation options, with the possibility that remaining lines
would gain monopoly power and reduce service quality. Thus, one policy
choice made in each merger case,.although not always consciously, was
where to keep local service available on a dispersed basis, and where
to end the traffic dilution for greater efficiency in the long-distance
bulk markets.
A second policy issue also not actively considered, was whether
the mergers would encourage duplicative investment in coal facilities
on competing merged systems (for instance the Burlington Northern and
PacRail). By allowing mergers to eliminate one form of redundant in-
vestment, the ICC might be promoting another. The expedited merger
hearings did not focus on national transportation, employment, or
energy goals, however, but were instead used as a forum for negotiat-
ing inter-company conflicts of interest. Since the ICC had relin-
quished its authority to force the inclusion of weaker roads, it might
have been expected to take a broader view of each merger, as an incre-
ment of national and regional transportation policy, ruling on the
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cases as a whole rather than becoming absorbed in parochial disputes.
However, as one consumer-advocate participant commented, each merger
had "a life ot its own," and only industry arguments were actively
considered.73 A Congressionally-established public interest organiza-
tion, the Rail Public Counsel, hired a team of economists to analyze
the CSX merger from the standpoint of nationwide cost savings and
overall rail service quality, but the group's testimony was largely
ignored. 74
The expedited process meant that larger railroads' internal dis-
putes could crowd out those of smaller companies, with fewer legal
resources. Although the four giant systems proposed would serve
distinct regions, there are points at which they overlap and would
compete against each other. The prospect of one merger approval re-
ducing another large system's traffic resulted in an ironic mix of
testimony, further demonstrating the railroads' ability to steer the
public perception of events. For instance, in the CSX case in 1980,
the Norfolk and Western demanded a battery of protective conditions
for its own traffic.75 N&W petitioned for a ruling that CSX be pro-
hibited from making any changes in the schedule or service standards
of the former Chessie or Seaboard lines. And if CSX were to develop
joint routings between the Southeast and West with other railroads,
N&W wanted a protective condition that would require CSX to offer
N&W similar joint routings on the same terms. N&W asked the ICC for
a promise of access to the VEPCO plant at Wheelright, Virginia, in
order to "provide VEPCO an alternative carrier" and "compensate for
the merger's anti-competitive effects." 76
When it came time for N&W's own merger case a year later, however,
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the themes of competition and equal treatment gave way to one of ef-
ficiency. N&W Vice President John Turbyfill applauded the unusually
quick handling of the Norfolk Southern merger case, saying that the
government
"has finally realized bigger railroads are more efficient.
We do what we do best, that is, haul bulk. We're like the
Bell System. You don't need 50 telephone companies to
make a call." 77
Thus, efficiency and competition only entered the cases as rhetorical
weapons. The same was true of energy concerns. N&W submitted three
volumes of energy and environmental impact studies in the CSX case,
to support its requests for protection. And the Boston & Maine Rail-
road claimed that the CSX merger would result in "circuitous routing
that will waste energy." 78  (The B&M wanted a promise of a direct
connection with CSX to "neutralize incentive for CSX to route only
over its own system.")
The logic of the industry's internal struggle, and the weight of
precedent for ICC adjudication, precluded any but a token representa-
tion or analysis of national policy issues. The industry continued to
absorb the agency's attention in its own affairs. The implementation
of railroad mergers shows once again that railroad policy is often
shaped around business fairness issues. The resulting mergers may
produce a more rational rail system, with better service on the rail-
roads' major commodities. But if so, it will only be as a by-product
of industry negotiation, backed as before by the regulations that re-
main.
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Legislative rate deregulation: the Staggers Act, 1980
In 1979, after Congress had passed legislation to deregulate
airlines, there was a strong momentum to develop similar comprehensive
deregulation packages for other transportation modes, including trucks
and railroads. The 4R Act, as noted earlier, had allowed only a
modest degree of rate flexibility, although sanctioning freer rates on
coal. The AAR had criticized the ICC for what it considered tentative
implementation of the 4R reforms.79
Most railroads still wanted to preserve anti-trust immunity, but
to reduce restrictions still in force on the use of contract rates
and discounts. Contract rates, or rates offered to individual shippers,
were only authorized in special circumstances (as in the case of piggy-
back traffic). All other rates had to be posted in general tariffs,
and discounts , even those offered at large, were prohibited.
The industry was generally united on the desirability of contract
and discount rates. The railroads were divided, however, over another
prospective reform: the deregulation of joint rates. 80  Joint rate
deregulation would have permitted railroads to post their own indepen-
dent rates for their respective portions of jointly-handled traffic.
Thus independent pricing decisions would have replaced the established
practice of collecting a single shipping payment, and splitting it
among the railroads according to the divisions formulas. Small rail-
roads, particularly in the East, tended to receive internal cross-
subsidies from this arrangement, and did not want joint rates deregu-
lated. They pressured for continued ICC authority over divisions.81
Many larger railroads, including Conrail, were interested in posting
independent rates, in part for marketing image. 82
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The Carter administration proposed a bill in 1979 to deregulate
railroad rates, as well as the abandonment process, more radically than
any preceeding legislation. A milder form of the bill, known as the
Staggers Act, was passed in 1980.83 The Carter bill would have pro-
hibited the use of general rate increases, eliminated the industry's
anti-trust immunity, and deregulated joint rates. Railroads suc-
cessfully pressed for a modfication of the bill, in order to retain
these privileges in part.
The industry argued for continued exemption from anti-trust law
by stressing its special status. Jerry Conlon, Vice President of the
Chicago and North Western, stated that since
"the railroad industry is a fragile, interdependent network,
it deserves to have the oversight and staffing of people
conversant with transportation decisions and transportation
ramifications,"84
in short, the ICC. The railroads also continued to use the theme of
financial decline promoted earlier in the decade, though on a modi-
fied basis. This time, they emphasized the need for investment capi-
tal to pursue their new opportunities in the coal and grain export
markets. Thus the tone was more optimistic, or upbeat, than in the
early 1970s. Imperative need was now, simply, need.
Congress adopted the railroads' reasoning in the Staggers Act.
The bill's legislative intent section states:
Earnings by the railroad industry are the lowest of any
transportation mode, and are insufficien 5to generate
funds necessary for capital improvement.
The aggregate view of the industry's status lingered on from previous
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lobbying efforts, so that the general public tended to equate deregu-
lation with railroads' financial difficulties. The difficulties, in
turn, were linked to the industry's vital role in the economy, another
association from the past. For instance, the Northeast-Midwest Congres-
sional Coalition wrote in support of deregulation that
The railroad freight industry today is in a struggle for
survival...Tracks are in desperate need of repair and
equipment is crumbling with age. Yet the vital need for
railroads to play a continuing role in our nation's
transportation sector is unquestioned. Railroads
transport more than one-third of the nation's intercity
freight and serve as the principal carriers of coal,
grain, pulp and paper products, agricultual products,
chemical products, and other commodities.
Of course, the "desperate" and "vital" railroads were not necessarily
the same set. Rate deregulation was also likely to strengthen the
railraods with fewer financial problems, that had already improved
their facilities and could offer large-quantity discounts, more than
the unstable ones. But the AAR's history of aggregate presentations
continued to make the conceptual association between financial stabil-
ity and national importance nearly automatic for many Congressmen.
Similarly, the idea that rate regulation still stood in the way
of investment was questionable. The principal investment railroads
now contemplated was in the coal market, which had already been largely
deregulated. In fact, capital outlays for roadways and structures had
begun to climb significantly two years earlier, in 1977. Between
1977 and 1981, the railroad industry's capital budgets doubled.87
But as the Staggers Act preamble cited above demonstrates, the over-
riding impression was still one of insufficient funds.
Further, despite implications to the contrary, rail profitability
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was increasing, according to some indicators. In 1979, of the 14
largest railroads, excluding Conrail, only one had failed to make a
profit, and all but three had shown earnings growth since 1969 (see
Table 9). Thus, through a combination of old and new arguments, the
industry maintained a carefully balanced and aggregate image, with
growth prospects on one side and deterioration on the other.
The railroads also promoted a new business fairness theme, in
keeping with the spirit of deregulation. Instead of fairness between
railroads or between modes, they stressed equal treatment with other
industries. Assisted, perhaps, by growing public recognition that
the railroad industry was no longer a quasi-utility, but was becoming
a specialized business with a limited niche, railroad spokesmen were
able to argue that they deserved the privileges of any other business,
such as contract pricing. Although on the anti-trust front, as noted
above, the industry used the opposite argument--the need for special
treatment--where discount rates were concerned, rail spokesmen grew
more proletarian. After the Staggers Act was implemented, for
instance, Barry Combs of the Union Pacific praised the ordinary:
"We've been having a ball! We've been having sales! You
know, like K-mart--hire four boxcars, get one free. That
sort of stuff was impossible before."88
The smaller railroads, that stood to lose out if joint rates were
deregulated, also mixed financial optimism with business fairness ar-
guments. For instance, Alan Dustin, chief executive officer of the
Boston and Main Railroad argued against joint rate deregulation as
follows:
Table 9: Largest 15 U.S.
->
*
Railroad Companies, 1979
Operating revenues
($ millions)
Net income
($ mill ions)
Net income as %
of oper. revenues
Earnings growth
1969-1979**
Burlington Northern
Southern Pacific
Santa Fe Industries
Seaboard Coast Line
Industries
Missouri Pacific
Corporation
Chessie System
Union Pacific
Southern Railway
Norfolk & Western
Railway
Illinois Central
Gulf Railroad
Chicago & North Western
Transportation
Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & Pacific Railroad
(continued next page)
Company
5.4% 42.5%
5.16.8
8.9
6.1
9.0
6.5
3,250
2,626
2,556
2,174
2,008
1,860
1,712
1,467
1,449
895
747
471
12.8
10.2
26.7
10.8
176
180
228
133
180
120
149
161
199
132
4
(69)
NA
10.9
NA
13.8
9.213.7
14.7
0.5
def.
Table 9: Largest 15 u.s. Railroad Companies, 1979 (continued)
Operating revenues
Company ($ millions)
St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway
Rio Grande Industries
Soo Line Railroad
447
324
291
Net income
($ millions)
20
35
28
Net income as %
of oper. revenues
4.4
10.9
9.5
Earnings growth
1969-1979
3.5
17.0
17.7
Sources: Fortune, "The
Manual, 1981
50 Largest Transportation Companies," July 14, 1980 and Moody's Transportation
(Earnings growth is growth in earnings per share where both years show positive earnings)
This table reflects slightly different corporate entities than Table 6.
**
*
(continued)Table 9: Largest 15 U.S. Railroad Companies, 1979
Note: excludes Conrail.
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"The Boston and Maine Railroad is presently the oldest
bankrupt railroad in the United States. Deregulation
of joint rates would make the Boston and Maine.. .and
perhaps all of the New England carriers, captive rail-
roads, which would otherwise be totally destructive.
The Boston and Maine will be the first railroad in
modern times to effect an income base reorganization
within the confines of Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act. I would hate to see our hopes dashed by ill-
conceived and ill-implemented deregulation of the
joint rate issue." 89
In this case, the firm sought fair recognition, not for public service,
but for its own corporate struggle, and did not want the rules changed
before a dramatic announcement of solvency could be made.
The railroads' systematic arguments helped them modify the bill
proposed by the Carter administration, to achieve a more limited de-
regulation. The resulting Staggers Act authorized liberal use of
contract and discount rates. It did call for a phase-out of general
rate increases by 1984, but in vague language by comparison with the
Carter bill. The Act allows the ICC,
if necessary, to establish a formula to compensate for 90inflation that may be applied to more than one carrier.
This provides an indefinite loophole for the practice. And the
Staggers Act partially retains the anti-trust immunity of the rate
bureaus.91 Permission was granted for independent rate-setting on
joint traffic, but the bill does not prohibit joint rates. The bill
authorizes the ICC to set guidelines on the matter, and continue to
regulate disputes on a case-by-case basis.
The policy impacts of the Staggers Act are uncertain, in part
because the Act leaves considerable room for varied implementation.*
*
That implementation is difficult to predict, since the ICC's make-
up is presently mixed. Of 11 authorized seats, only four are filled,
with one commissioner each from the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan
administrations.92
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Some industry analysts believe small shippers will gain more influence
over rates than in the past, but lose authority over service avail-
ability and quality.93 The discounts present an opportunity for
lower consumer costs on some products (including agricultural products
and paper), but service contracting may draw railroads out of less
profitable grain-producing regions, with consequent economic dislo-
cation. The development of the Staggers Act proceeded with only
limited attempts to weigh these potential impacts. The railroads'
careful selection and systematic presentation of popular arguments
ensured that the bill would reflect the industry's narrower perception
of the issues involved.
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CONCLUSIONS
Despite a public impression to the contrary, deregulation of the
freight railroad industry has not been a general removal of regulations,
but an alteration of them. The changes were selective in several
ways. Some forms of deregulation applied only to specific firms, as
in the deregulation of abandonment for Penn Central. Railroads also
obtained regulatory changes for specific markets, such as coal, and
for large-scale traffic movements rather than rail service in general.
The industry did not win every concession it sought, but it signifi-
cantly shaped the terms of discussion, so that social policy concerns
were seldom articulated beyond the level of catch-words. Consequently,
the ICC and Congress did not make a thorough effort to predict policy
impacts, nor fully consider alternative policies.
The railroads systematically chose arguments compatible with
changing public opinion, to advance the form of deregulation they pre-
ferred. When united, they used an aggregate picture of the industry to
present their views. Where firms differed, two tendencies can be
noted. The more powerful railroads, with the most at stake, often
dominated the agenda. When this was not possible, they arranged com-
promises that continued to implicate the ICC in the more typical inter-
nal disputes.
The firms chose both business and social arguments appropriate to
1) the particular form of deregulation they sought, 2) their rela-
tive positions within the industry, and 3) the political environment.
For instance, while the central argument for higher aggregate revenues
persisted throughout the decade, it shifted in form. As the early
bankruptcies lost their initial political impact, the AAR was less able
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to create a sense of crisis, and its arguments focused on chronic
revenue shortfall. Ultimately, a note of optimism crept into the
argument, and this too corresponded with the growing view that rail-
roads should be made into profitable enterprises.
Social policy concerns such as regional employment, service ef-
ficiency, adequate market discipline, and energy use were not omitted
from the regulatory agenda, but they entered it primarily on a
rhetorical basis, coupled to arguments for business equity. Business
fairness arguments took a variety of forms, including fair traffic
shares, fair competition, fair profits, and fair treatment for the
railroad industry within the wider business community. Both forms of
argument, social policy and business fairness, were influential in
setting the tone of Congressional hearings and ICC proceedings. But
business fairness received most of the attention.
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CHAPTER THREE:
CONCLUSIONS
COMPARING DEREGULATION IN THE BUS AND RAIL INDUSTRIES
The public agenda for deregulation has taken shape somewhat dif-
ferently in the rail and bus industries. In each case, the industry's
structure and economic environment set boundaries on the firms'
motives for entering the regulatory change process. Each industry's
economic situation gave rise to a different mix of political motives
and arguments. Relatively stable economic features, such as industry
structure and operating practices, established the backdrop of indus-
try concerns. Some of these had little to do directly with deregula-
tion, but broke in much as they might have in any other federal hear-
ing on the industry. For instance, Greyhound Lines had long sought
better enforcement against unlicensed carriers, and chose deregulation
hearings as an opportunity to bring the issue up again. Other long-
standing concerns were more specifically tied to regulatory reform.
For example, several large railroads had been interested in reform of
the merger process for many years, and the industry had often sought
freedom for discount rates.
In addition to the firms' longstanding interests, recent economic
developments created incentives for selective deregulation in both
industries. The traditional markets, scheduled bus service and rail
general cargo, were declining. This, in combination with growing
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markets for specialized bulk commodities and charter services, created
new motives for regulatory change. Smaller bus firms were interested
in extricating themselves from low profit scheduled routes, in order
to concentrate more of their resources on the charter market, for
which they also required entry permission. Large railroads in major
agricultural and coal mining locations wanted new rate and merger
freedoms. But each industry could also point to a long-term, overall
decline in profitability as a justification for selective deregula-
tion.
In addition to its economic structure and climate, each industry
operates in a distinct political context, which influences its firms'
ability to tune the policy-making process to their goals. The prospect
of deregulation, with its promise of universal application, formed a
substantial point of overlap. But the form and scope of government
attention to the two industries, and the public view of their social
utility, were different, and had separate implications for the way
firms positioned the regulatory issues.
In each case, the firms chose their reform arguments from a range
of popular themes over which they had little control. However, they
chose from the available repertoire systematically, manipulating
policy dialogues to suit their goals. The set of themes evolved
somewhat differently between industries, since arguments were gauged
directly to perceptions of what each industry (or industry segment)
could provide to the public. But in each case, the arguments helped
to structure the evolution of new regulatory policies with a minimum
of close scrutiny to broad public and consumer concerns.
In both industries, the firms and their lobby associations used
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rationales for regulatory change without much regard for consistency.
The Norfolk & Western, for instance, claimed that its own streamlined
merger would improve efficiency, while in the CSX merger hearings
(where N&W was a vulnerable party), the firm called for a full set of
traditional protections. In the bus case, Greyhound and Trailways
each developed one set of arguments for state lobbying, and another
for Congress. The arguments also showed little consistency over
time. Greyhound first praised traditional ICC regulations for their
"careful balance" of interests, then called them "archaic" impediments
to efficiency when the political context changed. Another form of
inconsistency appeared across lobbying objectives. When railroads
wanted to preserve anti-trust immunity, they argued that special at-
tention was appropriate; but when they sought discount rates, they
claimed they should be "treated like any other industry."
The set of arguments in each industry varied with the firms'
divergent motives. For instance, on the issue of forming Conrail, the
Union Pacific urged Congress to intervene and save the distressed
Northeastern region, while Norfolk & Western cautioned against wasting
government money in this manner. When the issue of subsidies for con-
struction of new bus stations arose in the House of Representatives,
Greyhound officials contended that their own terminals provided tho-
rough, and indeed, ubiquitous coverage, while Trailways stressed the
inconvenience to passengers of existing station locations.
In each case, firms used different labels for the same policy,
depending on their viewpoints. In the bus case, the terms "cream-
skimming" and "route flexibility" were used alternately to designate
the outcome of a freer entry policy, the first in a pejorative and
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the second in a laudatory sense. The House bill refers to the need
to avoid cream-skimming; the ICC bill (which Greyhound supported)
mentions flexibility instead. The same discrepancy is seen in the
rail case, where the terms "predatory rates" and "innovative market-
ing" were interchanged, depending on point of view. The Staggers Act,
less conservative than the bus bill, describes the advantage of lower
rate floors as the opportunity for innovative marketing.
Through the selective use of social arguments, both bus and rail
firms were able to promote concepts that ultimately colored the policy
dialogue, and often stood in place of genuine analysis or attention to
public needs. The American Bus Association emphasized the number of
locations the industry served as a justification for preserving status
quo franchises. The number of locations does not measure the value of
the service, and it does not address the issue of whether needs for
alternative scheduled services remain unmet. But the statistic
appears repeatedly in government reports and Congressmen's testimony,
indicating the importance it assumed in the debates. In the formation
of Conrail, the Penn Central and the Union Pacific were able to con-
vince the general public to focus on the concept of excess lines.
Their lobbying eclipsed other possible diagnoses of the Penn Central
situation, such as responsibility for a fixed work force; the firm's
apparently intentional disinvestment; and the possible interpretation
that the bankruptcy was not even a public problem. Another example
of the firms' control over the dialogue is seen in the emphasis on
minimum insurance requirements in the bus hearings, Although the
industry repeatedly promoted the theme of passenger safety and that of
carrier fitness, Congress gave little attention to whether unlicensed
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operations actually posed a significant problem for passenger safety,
or for the financial health of marginal firms.
The following sections compare the two cases to see what dif-
ferences may be responsible for particular features of their regula-
tory reform dialogues. The characteristics, or variables, considered
are loosely classified as belonging to either the "economic environ-
ment" or the "political environment." While in this exploratory dis-
cussion, it would be premature to suggest a model structurally relat-
ing these economic and political variables, they undoubtedly interact,
together conditioning the regulatory reform agenda in each industry.
Table10 provides an overview of potentially relevant differences in
the industries' economic and political environments.
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Business motives and political rhetoric differed between the two
industries in part because of their respective capital and operating
characteristics; their industrial organization; and their place in the
larger transportation market. Two major operating differences shaped
the way firms in each industry sought, through selective deregulation,
greater control over their markets. These are 1) the degree of cooper-
ation required to handle traffic and passengers, and 2) the capital
requirements of providing service.
Operating characteristics
The rail industry has been much more interdependent than the bus
industry, because it is less concentrated and transportation distances
are longer. Long distance shipments typically require traffic to be
interchanged between rail lines at several points, with alternative
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TABLE 10: Principal Industry Differences
Characteri sti c Bus Rail
Economic environment
* industry size
* industrial
organization
* operating
characteristics
e markets
* cost structure
Political environment
* public image
e external organized
interests
* jurisdictional
division of
regulatory practice
* regulatory history
e technologies
e small * large
e more
concentrated
e national-level
firms
e relatively
independent
e passenger
* most powerful
firms occupy
shrinking
market
* low capital
(when govern-
ment provides
roadways)
* low visibility
* lack of
politically
active
consumers
* relatively strong
state boards
* shorter, more
straightforward
* relatively new
technology;
always had
external
competition
* less
concentrated
* no national-level
fi rms
* relatively
i nterdependent
* freight
e most powerful
firms occupy
growing markets
* high capital
(when industry
provides roadways)
* higher visibility
* politically active
consumers
a relatively weak
state boards
* longer, more
complex
* relatively old
technology;
developed without
much external
competition
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possibilities for routing the shipments onto competing lines. The
complex system of rules that the industry and the ICC have negotiated
for handling, and pricing, joint traffic created vested interests
both against and in favor of any reforms. These interests are some-
times regionally aligned, as they tend to be on the issue of joint
rates. But the alignments are generally situational and transient,
which precludes the formation of coherent factions. The divisions
rules and merger protective conditions are often specific to firms
and locations. Each firm, including the more dominant, is vulnerable
to traffic loss if the joint traffic rules are changed (or eliminated)
in such a way as to remove the firm's historic advantage,
In the bus industry, the mechanism for protecting market shares
is much simpler. Although the same issues of joint fares and schedule
coordination occasionally produce disputes, the route franchises allow
relatively independent operations without the same degree of competi-
tion on routes. (Unit costs per mile are also more uniform in the bus
than the rail industry, so that joint fares can be handled on a
straight per-mile formula basis.) The conflicts that arise over bus
franchises are more predictable than those over joint traffic agree-
ments in the rail case. In many areas, franchise conflicts are just
between Greyhound and Trailways, or between Greyhound and a regional
operator. The division of interests this situation produces with
respect to deregulation is relatively clear-cut, with recognizable
factions: Greyhound, Trailways, charter operators, etc. In the rail
industry, the parochial nature of market disputes, and the larger
number of firms involved, means that the same railroad more often
emerges on both sides of a reform issue, since it may lose out in one
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application of a new rule, but win in another. Thus is is harder for
Congress to accomodate disputes in advance through formulaic legisla-
tive solutions.
One result of the difference in levels of coordination is that
the railroad industry as a whole has pressed for greater retention
of ICC authority. Few railroads have advocated the elimination of
anti-trust immunity, while several bus interests did. In the rail
case, also, issues of inter-company equity came up more frequently
in administrative than in legislative proceedings. Bus lobbyists
may have been more optimistic about successfully explaining inter-
company differences to Congressmen, and winning sympathy for their
positions, than rail lobbyists, who were also more familiar with the
ICC's supervision than were the state-regulated bus companies.
Capital requirements
A related difference is found in the industries' capital require-
ments. The railroads have a much greater fixed investment in their
track and facilities. For railroads, entering a new market generally
means investing in improved or specialized equipment to offer qualita-
tively new services. Few firms contemplate constructing new rail
lines, and their investment in new markets (via equipment purchase or
track repair) is not directly subject to regulatory control. But the
fixed nature of the investment means that each firm is concerned about
protecting its existing traffic, including traffic dependent on the
investment decisions of other railroads. Small firms with only a few
lines are frequently concerned about losing their traffic due to the
disinvestment or exit decisions of other railroads. Thus, market entry
123
is a minor issue, while exit liberalization poses threats (and oppor-
tunities) which, as in the case of joint rates and traffic agreements,
can more easily be accommodated on a case basis.
In the bus industry, entry deregulation would inevitably change
some firms' market shares, if only slightly. In the absence of entry
controls, more resourceful firms could easily cut into other firms'
markets, using existing equipment and publicly provided roads. And
with small amounts of capital, new firms can began serving established
markets. Without route controls and insurance barriers, the industry
could become more internally competitive, especially on high-volume
routes. Hence, each segment of the industry has taken a position on
what constitutes equitable reordering of franchise rights, and adequate
guarantees of fitness and safety. But the industry could agree on
exit liberalization with little difficulty,
Division of markets
In both industries, the declining markets -- small-scale rail
service and scheduled bus service -- are what might be termed retail
markets. The relatively ascendant markets -- for specialized bulk
hauling and bus tours -- are package or wholesale operations, in
contrast. In each case, the established pattern of regulation had
evolved to suit the retail operations, while deregulation had to take
account of the different type of operation involved in volume sales.
However, in the bus industry, the most powerful company, Greyhound,
occupied the traditional market, while in the rail case, the most
powerful firms occupy the new markets. This difference may help to
explain the greater emphasis on the theme of service flexibility (as
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an advantage of deregulation) in the bus industry, where the dominant
firm sought freedom to shed peripheral services. In the rail case,
more attention was granted to the idea that deregulation would open
innovative markets. The theme of innovation was somewhat muted in
the bus industry discussion, perhaps because small entrepreneurs and
operations not yet formed -- who would be the natural voice for market
innovation -- did not have the wherewithal to participate meaningfully
in the dialogue. The large bus carriers often mentioned the possibili-
ty that new operations would spring up to take over routes that they
dropped or cut back. But the possibility of altogether different
types of bus services being developed was not granted much discussion,
in contrast to the rai:l case.
Industrial concentration
In addition to market differences, the industries' relative con-
centration may also have affected the reform dialogues. Both the rail
and bus industry are concentrated, but the bus industry is more so,
and has been for a long period. Since Greyhound has a nationwide mar-
ket more extensive than any railroad's, and it has unusually signifi-
cant lobbying resources among bus firms, it could hope to benefit from
total deregulation, and the withdrawal of anti-trust exemption. Once
regulatory reform legislation became a likelihood, Greyhound advocated
total deregulation. In the rail industry, no firm advocated total
deregulation at any point. Thus, in the bus case, there was more use
of the rhetoric of deregulation itself. Railroad spokesmen commented
more modestly on the need for change, but placed more emphasis on
financial arguments not specifically centered on the problem of
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"stifling regulation."
The bus industry's greater concentration distinguishes the bus
and rail agendas in another way. The obvious dominance of Greyhound
in the public mind permits the firm to make public service claims
(such as the claim of support for the U.S. tourist industry) on behalf
of the whole industry. In the railroad case, despite considerable
economic concentration, no one or two firms have such prominence on
a nationwide level. Greyhound has an advantage that larger railroads
lack, since they must rely on the merits of their own policy posi-
tions, which of course are more restrictive than the public services
of the whole industry. This difference appears to have given the
AAR a more central role in deregulation than the American Bus Associa-
tion. On the other hand, Greyhound's dominance makes smaller firms'
complaints about the problem of Greyhound monopoly power more immedi-
ately credible than similar complaints in the rail industry. With
industry control more dispersed, it is difficult for the weaker rail
firms to win Congressional sympathy by pointing to the specific firms
they regard as aggressors. In the rail industry, to be successful,
this type of claim must generally be made in a setting attuned to the
complexity of the more fragmented rail market. Therefore, in the rail
case, it was in individual merger and rate hearings, as opposed to
legislative debates, that the smaller firms could cultivate the
greatest concern for equitable treatment.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
The political environment also helped determine both bus and rail
firms' motives and agenda arguments. The political environment can be
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said to include the common (public) view of the industry's status
and public mission, the relative disposition of agencies (and juris-
dictions) to see policies in a manner consistent with industry views,
the external interests, and the nature of Congressional attention to
the industry's concerns.
Public Image
One similarity between the bus and rail industries' political
milieu was the public perception that each was the underdog among its
competitorsin the intercity passenger and freight markets, respective-
ly. The idea that scheduled bus service or general cargo rail trans-
portation form essential public utilities lost some of its force as
their market shares declined. Hence it was not difficult for the
lobbyists to argue that the firms should be treated like any other
businesses, rather than being relegated to stand-by service in the
shrinking markets. The declining significance of each industry made
their arguments for greater efficiency relatively promising. Had the
industries appeared widely important (for instance, as the airline
industry does), proposals for increased efficiency might have aroused
more concern about possible service cutbacks. But in the rail and bus
industries, more remote from everyday consciousness, one is perhaps
less likely to think of service cutbacks when hearing the word
"efficiency." Freight transportation has lost its reputation as the
backbone of the economy, and intercity bus services have a much lower
political profile than Amtrak. If the industries were to continue
to function profitably, it seemed appropriate to many people that they
do so by scaling down to more limited niches.
The public's view of the two industries was quite different,
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however. The rail industry had long been considered an important
piece of U.S. economic infrastructure, and it had major symbolic
associations that militated against radical shrinkage of the system.
The bus industry, by comparison, was never part of the economic main-
stream. It was always a secondary mode of travel, first while rail
passenger travel dominated the market, and later overshadowed by auto
and air travel. This difference may partially explain the bus indus-
try's greater reliance on a theme of service to dependent populations,
which contrasts with the rail lobby's emphasis on financial decline.
The bus industry evidently hopes to win recognition by focusing atten-
tion on its customers' needs, whereas rail firms more often focus at-
tention on their own needs. Of course, social dependency themes are
more easily brought to the forefront where services are intended for
household rather than industrial consumers, so part of this distinc-
tion may be due to the different images passenger and freight service
project. The bus industry also had few visible bankruptcies to point
to in making its claims. (Bankruptcies are common among the indepen-
dent operators, but attract only local attention.) But vulnerable
railroads, seeking traffic guarantees, have also used social depen-
dency arguments on occasion, referring to small farmers, lumberyards,
or rural towns that appear to depend on rail service for survival.
The fact that such arguments are infrequent, in contrast to the bus
firms' social dependency arguments, still needs explanation.
Another possible reason for the bus industry's greater use of
humanitarian appeals is its lower public visibility. For bus indus-
try needs to be taken seriously from a national perspective, the bus
lobby had to form arr association between the industry's financial con-
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dition and the social services it performs. The rail lobby has not
had to actively cultivate conceptual associations between the indus-
try's financial status and broader public needs, such as regional
employment, the overall condition of the economy, or service to export
markets. These associations tend to be automatic, and seldom criti-
cally evaluated, so the rail lobby is free to work on reinforcing
them. Hence the industry has relied in its lobbying efforts on the
overall premise that the industry must be financially sound, and the
related assertions 1) that it is not sound now, but 2) it could become
so. The threat to the public of a weak railroad system was often im-
plied, in the nature of a warning, rather than spelled out directly,
in rail executives' testimony. To the extent the rail lobby has taken
up new themes such as energy and environmental conservation, these are
icing on the cake of financial necessity. Since the bus industry is
so much less prominent, even its broad economic rationales (such as
service to tourism-dependent regions) had to be specifically con-
structed for the debates on regulatory reform. Also, since scheduled
service passengers form a minority group, the industry can appeal to
its customers' special situation, when this suits the policy position
taken. This is more difficult for railroads, since even the more vul-
nerable groups of shippers tend to have organized lobbies known to the
ICC and Congress, and capable of making their own presentations.
Regulatory history
The rail industry's more prominent status within the transporta-
tion market also accounts for the more complex, evolutionary nature of
the rail regulatory reform process. Congressional attention to the
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bus industry is embryonic, since bus legislation is undertaken infre-
quently. The deregulation bill was a novelty both to Congress and the
industry. Rail deregulation has had a longer history, both as a con-
cept and a policy. The ICC had liberalized service abandonments and
special rates on piggyback service in the 1960s, for instance. And
the rate structure reforms of the early 1970s preceded the emergence
of deregulation as a-popular concept. By contrast, deregulation of the
bus industry is a recent development, beginning with administrative
liberalization of interstate entry controls during the late 1970s.
Deregulation of the bus industry has been described as an after-
thought. Legislation deregulating the airline, trucking, and rail
industries created a precedent for changes in bus regulation, as the
last regulated transportation industry to be discovered for application
of a general principle. Bus deregulation was also in part a direct
response to airline deregulation, which threatened some bus firms'
revenues, and to the creation of Amtrak. Bus industry lobbyists acted
with the awareness that the industry would seldom arrive on the nation-
al agenda. Many firms appeared to view it as their one opportunity to
achieve, or block, reforms. The railroad industry, in contrast, ex-
periences new legislation each year, and is able to rely on greater
recourse to the ICC if unfavorable legislative reforms pose a problem.
Interjurisdictional divisions
Another difference in the course of deregulation stems from the
historic discrepancy in federal and state regulation of the two indus-
tries. In each case, state regulation initially formed the more signi-
ficant controls. In the rail case, however, state supremacy was large-
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ly eliminated through preemptive legislation in the early 1900s.
During the period of rapid inflation beginning in the late 1960s,
railroads successfully pressed for the elimination of vestigial state
control over intrastate rates, and Congress established that these
rates would be pegged to ICC decisions on nationwide rates. The
current bus legislation represents the first instance in which the
bus industry has been able to achieve public attention for similar
measures. So while each legislative reform prospect in the rail case
drew out classic arguments often used in other rail policy-making
contexts (e.g., the competitive or anti-competitive effects of speci-
fic rate changes), in the bus case, the potential for a novel legisla-
tive compromise made room for new arguments.
Table 11 summarizes the differences in the regulatory reform
agendas of the two industries. Some of the differences observed can
be attributed to distinctions in both the economic and political en-
vironments. For instance, federal bus legislation was more of a novel-
ty, and arguments were developed specifically for legislative lobby-
ing, probably both because the industry has a history of state regu-
lation and because it serves a small market not integrated into the
industrial economy. And the rail industry pressed for greater reten-
tion of ICC case discretion, not only because the ICC has an estab-
lished tradition for resolving rail intra-industry conflicts, but also
because the rail industry's interdependent operations and high capital
obligations create continual, parochial conflicts in which firms can-
not easily agree to abide by a general formula.
The difference in industry environments accounts, also, for the
rail industry's greater use of financial themes and the bus industry's
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TABLE 11: Industry Differences in the Regulatory Reform Agenda
Differences in lobbying
* relatively stable bus factions form predictable coalitions;
contrasts with situational, transient rail factions
e administrative emphasis in rail case; legislative emphasis
in bus case
* total deregulation only considered in bus case
* greater agreement on liberalized abandonments in bus case
* federal legislation common in rail industry, novel in bus case
* reliance on classic federal-level arguments in rail case
contrasts with newer bus arguments
* bus industry attempts to speak for its own consumers, and unlike
rail industry, can emphasize social usefulness in a vacuum
Difference in nature of arguments
* bus spokesmen use social dependency themes more extensively
* rail officials emphasize financial breakdown rather than social
needs arguments
* in rail case, inter-company equity arguments predominate in
administrative rather than legislative setting; bus officials
more readily employ fairness arguments in both settings
* rail industry can play on major symbolic associations
* in rail case, more attention given to prospect of innovative
marketing; in bus case, more attention to service flexibility
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greater reliance on social utility themes, although the precise
source of this difference is hard to pinpoint. It could be attri-
buted to the distinction between passenger and freight services;
to the absence of organized bus consumers; or to the bus industry's
lower visibility and frequently negative image. The rail industry
seemed to benefit from public assumptions that railroad profitability
is a legitimate public policy goal in itself. And the composition
of the industries may account for the greater emphasis on service
flexibility and exit freedom in the bus case, and marketing innova-
tions in the rail case.
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AGENDA-SETTING: ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Other interest groups
The bus and rail cases show that transportation firms have had a
major influence on the deregulation agenda in Congress and in other
agencies. However, their influence does not exist in a vacuum. For
a more sophisticated understanding of the regulatory reform process in
transportation, it would be necessary to consider the political in-
fluence of other business interests beyond transportation firms, such
as the oil companies. One critic of the Conrail plan, for instance,
charges that it was a "deliberate blueprint for the destruction of the
northeastern railroads," perhaps engineered by the "highway, oil and
aerospace interests that financed and otherwise dominated the Nixon
administration."' It is not necessary to find active conspiracy, how-
ever, to appreciate the possibility that business groups more promi-
nent than the transportation companies themselves may have played a
subtle role in the deregulation debates, not captured in this discus-
sion. A fuller understanding of rail rate deregulation, for instance,
could require detailed research on the grain export industry's partici-
pation, not only in the Staggers Act, but in rail policy-making
generally.
Labor groups and public officials bring their own set of arguments
to the debates over bus and rail regulatory reform. The major inter-
city bus unions opposed deregulation, since they were concerned that
liberal exit policies would scale down the size of the industry. The
rail unions took a variety of stands on the reform measures discussed
earlier, and were influential in obtaining the labor protection pro-
visions in the 3R Act. For a complete account of the reform agenda
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in each case, it would be necessary to compare the arguments of labor
and political leaders (including state-level officials) with those
used by firms and industry spokesmen. In some cases they are similar.
For instance, the United Transportation Union leaders often commented
on the energy efficiency of railroads when arguing for policies favor-
able to their own companies' business volume.2 And governors have
testified against unfair treatment of their states' industries by the
rail rate structure. But it would obviously be useful to consider the
interplay of the industries' own rationales with those of other parti-
cipants. In this connection, the degree of inter-regional conflict
over federal policies toward the industry could also be important.
For instance, since on average railroads serve wider geographic mar-
kets than bus companies (excepting Greyhound), rail regulation is
more likely to be a divisive issue regionally. (In Congress, inter-
regional conflict over rail policy has been considerable, while there
tends to be less of it in the case of trucking.)
The role of organized transportation customers in setting the
reform agenda also deserves greater consideration than was possible
here. In the rail case, large shipping interests could benefit from
contract and variable rate authority, while smaller rail-dependent
firms organized against the service disruptions and rate increases
they feared would result from the rate freedoms. The compromises
worked out in the formation of Conrail and in the Staggers Act reflect
the additional complexity of customer involvement, lacking in the bus
case. The agreements railroads work out with large shippers, outside
of the regulatory process, also undoubtedly figure in the development
of the rail policy debates. (In the bus case, the only external in-
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dustry significantly dependent on policy outcomes is the packaged
tour industry, which has generally sided with bus lobbyists' requests
for reduced tour certification requirements.) The lack of politically
active groups external to the bus industry, in contrast to the rail
case, may have implications for implementation of the reforms. It
may be politically less expensive to experiment with bold reforms --
and thus bolster the appearance of satisfying an ideological clamor
for deregulation -- when the regulated industry is not enmeshed in a
tangle of related business interests. Bus deregulation would thus be
easier for an administration to contemplate than rail, truck, or air-
line deregulation. And in fact, while the Reagan administration claims
to favor complete deregulation of the bus industry, and has not en-
dorsed the compromise bill passed by the House, the administration is
implementing rail and truck deregulation quite conservatively.
Another question to consider is to what extent the industries'
lobbying efforts represented long-run political strategy, and to what
extent they were purely reactive to externally determined events.
For instance, Greyhound simply reacted to the propsect of bus deregu-
lation, but the Union Pacific may have prepared a strategy in advance
of the Penn Central's threatened abandonments. The task of isolating
firms' motives for regulatory reform, and ascertaining the degree of
corporate planning involved, sometimes requires consideration of a
larger conglomerate of which the transportation firm may form only a
small part. In the case of railroads, complex stock ownership patterns
and interlocking directorates can make determination of any given rail
manager's ultimate motivations very difficult: ownership mysteries of
this sort generally pose a problem for more thorough research on the
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topics outlined in this paper. Some comparison with other industries
could be useful in distinguishing strategy from reaction.
Comparison with other industries
An extended comparison, incorporating the airline and trucking
deregulation processes, could provide more insight into the way regu-
latory reform arguments develop. The bus and rail cases may differ
in some respects from the airline case, since they involved the ICC,
a unique institution and the oldest federal regulatory agency. The
ICC has an unusually large body of regulatory case law, and is geared
up to consider business fairness arguments in every conceivable per-
mutation. Industries regulated by a less formal, adversary procedure
may be less likely to construe their policy arguments in equity terms.
Comparison with non-transportation industries would also reveal a
different use of strategy and rhetoric in the regulatory reform
process, and suggest which of the features of industrial organization
touched on here are most promising clues to understanding the reform
process. The nature of the bus and rail industries as sysitems of
"rivals and joint venturers," particularly noticeable in the rail
case, may be atypical for regulated American industry. In cases where
regulated firms are competitors without a high degree of mutual depen-
dence -- as in the pharmaceutical or broadcasting industries, for
instance -- the deregulation process is perhaps less likely to give
rise to a coordinated, compromise strategy among firms.
Within the transportation field, airline deregulation might
provide the most instructive comparisons to the bus and rail cases.
Similar issues arose in the legislative agenda for airline regulatory
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reform. For instance, Congress gave considerable attention to what
was considered the "problem of small communities." As in the cases
here, the firms were split on the form of legislation they supported.
Five of the large airlines advocated complete deregulation (American,
Continental, Delta, Trans World, and United), while the others wanted
joint tariff powers and antitrust immunity.3 And the chief industry
trade group, the Air Transport Association, presented an extensive
array of industry-wide social arguments for more favorable regulation.
Concurrent policy changes
To fully understand the selective nature of regulatory reform it
would also be desirable not only to make cross-industry comparisons,
but to consider concurrent policy changes that may escape detection in
the course of reform discussions but still be significant, either in
tracing firms' motives for reform, or evaluating the outcome of deregu-
lation accurately. Many rail firms, for instance, will realize large
cash flow improvements as a result of changes in accounting methods
for track and other fixed assets, owing to the National Recovery Tax
Act of 1981.4 It would of course be spurious to attribute the result-
ing profits to rate deregulation, yet industry spokesmen are likely to
attempt to do so, in order to preserve or extend their gains from
regulatory reform (by showing that deregulation "is working"). In
addition to the tax code, two other policy areas that deserve consider-
ation in tandem with regulatory reform of each industry include the
bankruptcy laws, and government regulation of labor relations.
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Secular ideological changes
In order to fully understand the formation of regulatory policy
in these industries, it would be necessary to look beyond businessmen's
statements at more global changes in public opinion. The rationales
that business groups use emerge from a complex mixture of conceptual
habits and ideologies, cultural as well as political in origin. For
instance, the railroads' introduction of efficiency arguments in the
late 1970s was probably due to the resurgence of efficiency as a
popular concept in the U.S., rather than simply to the railroads'
renewed interest in acquiring high-yield equipment. The difficulty of
distinguishing the firms' own ideological creations from broader under-
currents of public opinion makes it hard to trace the effect on policy
of a switch from one argument to another.
To understand the conceptual power of business fairness princi-
ples, for example, requires identifying their ideological origin.
The theme of business fairness seems particularly enduring in American
politics, while others (such as the resource conservation theme) emerge
only periodically. Business equity as a controlling idea may be
derived from early American culture; yet the quasi-judicial procedures
of the ICC no doubt helped endow this theme with the high regard it now
enjoys in transportation policy. Whether the concept made its appear-
ance on the regulatory reform agendas through habit, or whether the
specific uses devised by bus and rail firms were themselves critical
policy determinants, is a question beyond the scope of this discussion.
Yet more exploration might help to distinguish universal from idiosyn-
cratic features in the cases examined here. It might turn out, for
instance, that the threat of business failure always has a major role
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in shaping the course of regulatory reform. Business failure, and
public intolerance of it, may serve as a major catalyst for significant
restructuring of government involvement in other regulated industries.
Every bankruptcy in a regulated industry can potentially be pinned on
the unfairness of regulators, as well as on poor management or exo-
genous market conditions. The threat of bankruptcy may serve to dis-
cipline regulators not only because of direct pressure from the concern
involved, but because to allow the firm to fail, even if the reasons
lie elsewhere, appears unfair.
A final puzzle that a study of regulatory reform cannot in itself
solve is the nature of the mechanism by which firms' social arguments
actually exert their influence in policy making. I have implied that
industry rationales are powerful because they genuinely convince their
listeners. Yet one may raise the objection that Congressmen or ICC
personnel are in a position to spot the posturing in the lobbyists'
policy statements: after all, they hear them every day. They may
respond favorably because of direct pressure, while remaining indif-
ferent to the intellectual arguments the firms advance. The arguments,
or window dressing, may be so transparent in many cases as to provoke
impatience with the speaker; or they may simply serve as a polite
ritual. Why, then, bother to examine their conceptual origins and the
instances in which they are used?
Clearly, conceptual and ideological tools do not do all the
political work by themselves, and they vary in their forcefulness.
However, the power of window dressing should not be underestimated
on the grounds that some actors realize it is window dressing. Indus-
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try rationales or postures may still do much to influence not only the
choice of a general policy direction, but also the details, which often
come to have their own importance. And if the general public does not
recognize window-dressing, Congressmen and administrators may use the
same suspect arguments to justify unwarranted decisions to their con-
stituencies. At this point, of course, the politeness ends. For in-
stance, in recent testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, ICC
Chairman Reese Taylor defended his retreat from truck regulatory reform
by saying:
"The Commission is beginning to receive a number of rate
tariffs that appear to be predatory. The ICC has the
responsibilit to ensure that rates are not anti-
competitive."
It would not be surprising to hear thi's phrase used ten years from now,
and after two more deregulation bills were passed. One may regard it
skeptically, but it must be credited with some power of its own, apart
from that of its users.
In another instructive example, one can see the same kind of
independent power in the business fairness principle, despite the com-
plete transparency of its use. Pressed by the Water Transport Associa-
tion, Representative John Dingell of Michigan has proposed that the
ICC reopen an old grievance and review the amount of land grant assis-
tance given to the rail industry during the nineteenth century, as part
of a pending rail merger case. The Water Transport Association recently
charged that the rail industry received unfair subsidies at that time,
and has hired a consultant to prove it.6 Bennett Whitlock, president
of the American Trucking Association, has jumped on the land grants
issue as well:
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The railroad industry to this day continues to be the
beneficiary of what must be the biggest government give-
away program in history -- the land grant program of
1850. The railroads nuzzled up to the public trough
then, and they are still there today. 7
,In this statement, the ATA obviously wanted to create the impression
that the federal government has been unfair to truckers (in this case,
not to any particular firm, but to the whole industry). The argument
is unabashedly aimed at preventing Congress from imposing new highway
user charges on trucking firms. One may easily dissect the statement,
and reject the equity contention as a simple facade for industry
factional interests. The statement even seems absurd: the government
is to compensate truckers for damage done to them before the invention
of the truck! Yet whether or not this statement directly convinces
any Congressmen, or helps truckers to stall the imposition of new
highway charges, the unfair land grants argument must be effective on
its own merits, since the railroads' competitors have been using it
for at least forty years. Perhaps it creates a lingering impression
of an injustice done, even as it gives away the ulterior motive it
cannot actually hide. By absorbing attention from genuine public
concerns, business fairness arguments of this kind, and spurious social
utility arguments, reduce the prospects for developing reasonable
policies. More attention should be given to the specific ways that
they influence the policy-making process.
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